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ABSTRACT 
The subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States in 2008, which struck the U.S. 
economy tremendously, and moreover, the world’s economy. In response to the crisis, the U.S. 
government enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act, 
however, focused mainly on enhancing regulatory systems rather than considering how the Act 
affected small-scale financial institutions, including thrifts, which play a major role in the U.S. local 
housing development industry.  
In addition, the Act did not accord with the principles of the Government Accountability 
Office, and left certain regulatory measures intact, including the Qualified Thrift Lending test. Under 
this new regime, thrifts may face difficulty maintaining their businesses because of the heavy burden 
of complying with stringent and inappropriate regulations that were passed following the Act.  
In addition to the problematic issues facing the U.S., Korean savings banks have also been 
meeting difficulties since the Korean Savings Bank Crisis of 2010, which resulted in the failure of 
twenty-five percent of total savings banks and cost more than $26 billion with more than 100,000 
victims. Even though the Korean government tried to solve the problems facing the savings bank 
industry after the crisis, savings banks have still been struggling to operate successfully. This lack of 
improvement is in part due to deficiencies in the financial regulatory system, such as lenient and 
insufficient regulations.  
This dissertation analyzes how the Dodd-Frank Act adversely affects the thrift industry with 
intensified regulations, and then offers suggestions on how to create more efficient regulations for the 
thrift industry. This dissertation also studies how the Korean savings bank industry can overcome its 
current trouble by analyzing the similarities between the savings bank crisis and two U.S. experiences, 
the Savings & Loans Association Crisis of the 1980s, and the Mortgage Crisis of 2008, and by 
researching what can be learned from the experiences.     
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  Background 
In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States (U.S.), 
which struck the U.S. economy tremendously, and moreover, the world’s economy. 
The crisis also gave rise to European sovereign default.1 In response to the crisis, the 
U.S. government enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) not only to solve the crisis but also to prevent future 
crises.2 The Dodd-Frank Act is not particularly novel—the U.S. government typically 
enacts strict statutes following an economic crisis. However, the Dodd-Frank Act has 
the potential to adversely affect the U.S. thrift industry. 
 Through the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. government has focused on removing 
the notion of “too big to fail,” but has not considered the unique circumstances of 
small-scale financial institutions, such as community banks and savings institutions.3 
Ignoring the needs of these smaller institutions, the government has put too much 
regulation on them, which may lead the institutions to meet difficulties in maintaining 
their business. 4  If the U.S. financial regulatory agencies put similar levels of 
regulation on thrifts as commercial banks, thrifts will struggle to survive. This is 
1 One crisis, two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems, 2012 ANNUAL 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE, 
http://gdresymposium.eu/papers/BurietzAurore.pdf. 
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
3 See Louise Bennetts, Thanks to Dodd-Frank, Community Banks Are Too Small to Survive, AMERICAN 
BANKER, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/thanks-to-dodd-frank-community-
banks-too-small-too-survive-1054241-1.html. 
4 See Tanya D. Marsh & Adjunct Scholar American Enterprise Institute, Regulatory Burdens: The 
Impact of Dodd Frank on Community Banking 1, 5 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, July 18, 2013). 
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because commercial banks and thrifts have different sizes, business types, and 
business purposes.5  
The U.S. thrift industry has been providing financial services to local residents 
and significantly contributing to local housing development.6 In order to keep thrifts 
alive in the U.S. financial market, this dissertation will analyze how the Dodd-Frank 
Act negatively affects the thrift industry, and will then provide useful suggestions to 
help the industry solve problems they may face in the future.   
In addition to the problematic issues following the Dodd-Frank Act, this 
dissertation also studies the Korean savings bank crisis of 2010. The crisis took place 
in 2010, and resulted in the failure of one fifth of all savings banks, including the 
largest and second largest savings banks in Korea.7 It also resulted in enormous costs 
to solve the crisis (more than $26 billion), and more than 100,000 victims.8 Currently, 
the savings banks are still struggling to stay in business.9  
5  See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, 
available at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main4.asp (as of June 30, 2013, all national commercial banks’ 
total assets, liabilities, and equity capital are over ten times greater than all national savings institutions’ 
according to the figures on the Statistics on Depository Institutions Reports of FDIC) (last visited Nov. 
10, 2013). 
6 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02[D] (2d ed. 2011). 
7  Kim, Tae-jong, 4 Savings Banks Suspended, THE KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at 
http://www,koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/05/123_110426.html; Choi, Myeong-yong, KDIC, 
26 Savings Banks Declared As Poor Financial Institutions for Three-Year, NEWS1, May 23, 2013, 
http://news1.kr/articles/1145314; KIM, YOUNG-PHIL, WHY DID SAVINGS BANKS GO BANKRUPT? 27 
(2012). 
8 Kim, Ji-hwan, Savings Bank Crisis Is Financial Accident, Costing $26 Billion with 100 Thousand 
Victims, KYUNGHYANG, Oct. 26, 2012, 
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201210262120315&code=920301. 
9 Im, Min-hee, Banking Industry, Acquirers have Problems to Normalize Acquired Savings Banks, 
MONETA, May 4, 2012, 
http://cn.moneta.co.kr/Service/paxnet/ShellView.asp?ArticleID=2012050409000500786; Kang, A-
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Korean savings banks play the important role of providing financial services 
to low-income people who are unable to receive financial services from commercial 
banks due to their credit status.10 Given the necessity of the savings bank industry for 
the Korean people, this dissertation will analyze the causes of the crisis, and then 
provide suggestions for the savings bank industry to overcome its difficulties. 
Interestingly, the Korean savings bank crisis and two financial crises in the U.S., the 
Savings and Loans Association Crisis of the 1980s, and the Mortgage Crisis of 2008, 
have several similarities in terms of financial regulation, making it meaningful to 
conduct a comparative study in order to provide solutions for the Korean savings bank 
industry.    
B.  Overview 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the problems that the Dodd-
Frank Act has created for U.S. thrifts, and to suggest appropriate regulations that will 
allow for the continued operation of thrifts in the banking industry. Concerning the 
current savings bank crisis in Korea, this study explores what can be learned from the 
U.S. experiences of the 1980s S&L crisis and the 2008 Mortgage Crisis. 
This dissertation consists of nine chapters. Chapter I presents the purpose and 
scope of the dissertation. Chapter II explains the Korean savings bank crisis in detail. 
Chapter II also introduces the Korean financial system overall by providing an 
reum, Savings Banks Are Still Poor Even After the Restructuring, HANKOOKI, Oct. 2, 2012, 
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201210/h2012100221041221500.htm. These articles state 
that the economic recession has negatively affected the savings bank industry. Since the savings bank 
crisis, savings banks are considered poor financial institutions, and this sentiment has also negative 
effects for acquirers wanting to normalize savings banks. 
10 See KOREA FEDERATION OF SAVINGS BANKS, http://www.fsb.or.kr (last visited June 20, 2013). 
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overview of financial regulations, regulatory agencies, and institutions. Chapter III 
explores the origins of the 1980s Savings and Loan Crisis in depth, including an 
overall background of U.S. financial institutions and regulatory agencies.  
Chapter IV examines whether the new regulations and regulatory agencies 
after the Dodd-Frank Act appropriately regulate the thrift industry in the U.S. This 
Chapter compares the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) 
recommendations with the Dodd-Frank Act, and elaborates on three points. The first 
point is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not achieve the consolidation of U.S. financial 
regulatory agencies, which raises the concern of a possible turf battle among the 
agencies.11 The second point is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not apply differentiated 
levels of regulation to different financial institutions based on risk-based criteria.12 
The third point is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not address the dependence of the 
OCC on its regulated institutions for budgetary purposes.13 In addition to these three 
points, Chapter IV further examines problems with the Qualified Thrifts Lending test.  
Chapter V studies how the Dodd-Frank Act adversely affects the community 
banks through over-regulation, including facing greater compliance costs, and serving 
standardized products and forms under the Act.14 Because community banks and 
thrifts are both minority depository institutions with small assets, and have smaller 
11 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 
55 (2009). 
12 Id. at 60.  
13 Id. at 59. 
14 See Christopher Brown, “Community Banks: Paper Delivered at Fed Conference Argues For Two-
Tiered Bank Regulatory System,” 101 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 556 (Oct. 4, 2013). 
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and more limited business models, it can be predicted what will happen to the thrift 
industry. Chapter V also provides hypothetical cases of how the thrift industry will be 
affected by the Dodd-Frank Act.   
Chapter VI analyzes the S&L Crisis, the Mortgage Crisis, and the Korean 
Savings Bank Crisis by studying what happened before and after each crisis. Then, 
this Chapter compares the crises in three ways: first, a comparison between the S&L 
Crisis and the Mortgage Crisis; second, a comparison between the S&L Crisis and the 
Korean Savings Bank Crisis; third, a comparison between the Mortgage Crisis and the 
Korean Savings Bank Crisis. In Chapter VII, solutions addressing the threats to the 
thrift industry are provided. The first solution for U.S. thrifts is to create a new budget 
system for federal regulatory agencies. This solution will ensure that regulatory 
agencies are more independent from their regulated institutions. The second solution 
for U.S. thrifts is to require financial regulatory agencies to apply different levels of 
regulation to financial institutions based on risk-based criteria. The third solution is 
that regulatory agencies should be able to adopt measures that are independent from 
their government’s stance on financial policy. The fourth solution for U.S. thrifts is to 
adjust the percentage of the QTL test based on the decreased portion of the mortgage 
lending market that thrifts currently hold. The last solution for U.S. thrifts is to permit 
the thrift industry to enjoy some level of protection, and to maintain their particular 
business area without losing it to competitors.  
Chapter VIII suggests solutions for Korean savings banks. Learning from the 
U.S. experience, the first solution is to enact new provisions for the corporate 
governance structure of savings banks that require the number of owners to be more 
5 
 
than one. The second solution is to set up a new program for financial regulators to be 
systematically educated and trained in order to combat corruption. The third solution 
is to make regulatory agencies more independent from their government’s financial 
policy agenda. The fourth solution is to reconsider the current insurance system for 
savings banks. The last solution is to allow savings banks to enjoy some protections 
for their unique business sector. Chapter IX is a conclusion of this dissertation.
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II.  SOURCE OF THE KOREAN SAVINGS BANK CRISIS 
A.  The Korean Savings Bank Crisis  
Since 2010, twenty-six savings banks have been suspended in Korea, which 
is more than one fifth of all savings banks in the country.1 Korea’s low-income class 
benefitted from making transactions with savings banks, which were established to 
provide financial services for the poor.2 After the series of suspensions in 2010, the 
savings bank industry has faced even more problems.3 The major causes of the 
savings bank crisis include weak regulation, inappropriate after-measures, and the 
moral hazard4 of savings bank owners (the controlling shareholders).5 
On January 4, 2011, the Korean government suspended Samhwa savings 
bank.6 Since this first suspension, twenty-five more suspensions followed, including 
the suspension of Busan savings bank and Dae-jeon savings bank.7 That the savings 
1  Kim, Tae-jong, 4 Savings Banks Suspended, THE KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at 
http://www,koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/05/123_110426.html; Choi, Myeong-yong, KDIC, 
26 Savings Banks Declared As Poor Financial Institutions for Three-Year, NEWS1, May 23, 2013, 
http://news1.kr/articles/1145314. 
2 See KOREA FEDERATION OF SAVINGS BANKS, http://www.fsb.or.kr (last visited June 20, 2013). 
3  After the current Korean savings bank crisis, savings banks often face problems operating 
successfully because they are considered poor financial depository institutions, see infra text 
accompanying p. 8. 
4 “Moral hazard is a situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is 
protected against the risk and the other party will incur the cost,” and “in a financial market, there is a 
risk that the borrower might engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view 
because they make him less likely to pay back a loan.” Definition of ‘Moral Hazard,’ THE ECONOMIC 
TIMES, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-hazard (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
5 Chamyeoyondae (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), Five Major Failures of Savings 
Banks Policy & 26 Responsible Officials, ISSUE REPORT, 1, 4 Mar. 29, 2012, 
http://www.peoplepower21.org/885934. 
6 Press Release, Financial Services Commission, Sam Hwa Savings Bank Declared As Poor Financial 
Institution and Ordered for Management Improvement (Jan. 14, 2011) (on file with Lee, Jin-su, Deputy 
Dir., Jo, Sung-rae, Vice Gen. Manager, and Kwon, Nam-jin, Team Leader, Fin. Services Comm’n). 
7 Choi, supra note 1.  
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bank crisis may give rise to serious problems in the financial market is of particular 
concern because most depositors who lost their deposits are low-income individuals. 
This crisis has cost the Korean society more than $26 billion, and the number of 
victims stands at more than 100,000.8    
In addition, savings banks that manage to stay open, and the acquirers of 
failed savings banks have struggled to normalize business.9 Among the acquirers of 
failed savings banks are a number of large financial holding companies, including KB, 
Shinhan, Woori, and Hana.10 All companies except for Woori recorded deficits since 
taking over the failed savings banks.11 More importantly, savings banks have been 
considered poor institutions, which may turn away potential depositors.12 If financial 
consumers choose to make transactions with commercial banks instead of savings 
banks, it may become impossible for savings banks to operate their business. 
Therefore, the current Korean savings bank crisis is a very serious issue, and the 
government should find solutions for both the crisis and the future of savings banks. 
8 Kim, Ji-hwan, Savings Bank Crisis Is Financial Accident, Costing $26 Billion with 100 Thousand 
Victims, KYUNGHYANG, Oct. 26, 2012, 
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201210262120315&code=920301. 
9 Im, Min-hee, Banking Industry, Acquirers have Problems to Normalize Acquired Savings Banks, 
MONETA, May 4, 2012, 
http://cn.moneta.co.kr/Service/paxnet/ShellView.asp?ArticleID=2012050409000500786; Kang, A-
reum, Savings Banks Are Still Poor Even After the Restructuring, HANKOOKI, Oct. 2, 2012, 
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201210/h2012100221041221500.htm. These articles state 
that the economic recession has negatively affected the savings bank industry. Since the savings bank 
crisis, savings banks are considered poor financial institutions, and this sentiment has also negative 
effects for acquirers wanting to normalize savings banks. 
10 See Kang. 
11 See id.  
12 Kim, Sang-hyun, In Pusan, People Prefer Commercial Banks over Savings Banks for Savings, 
YONHAPNEWS, July 25, 2011, 
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/07/25/0200000000AKR20110725115400051.HTML.  
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B.  The History of Korean Savings Banks 
 In the 1970s, many financial consumers suffered from the extreme interest 
rates of private moneylending institutions.13 In order to eradicate such sufferings and 
promote a sound financial industry, the Korean government approved the 
establishment of savings banks.14 
 Korean savings banks were established in 1972 not only to provide accessible 
financial services to low-income individuals and small businesses, but also to promote 
savings.15 The first title given to the newly created savings banks was mutual credit 
unions.16  In addition to promoting financial services for low-income people, the 
mutual credit unions were also expected to root out the moneylending businesses.17 
The title of mutual credit unions was changed in 2002 to mutual savings banks.18 
Since the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, the Korean financial industry has suffered 
greatly. 19  During the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, about sixty-seven 
authorizations of mutual credit unions were canceled and about twenty-six unions 
were merged.20 Even more restructuring took place up until June of 2001.21 At that 
13  See Hong, Ji-min & Hong, Hee-kyoung, A History of the Transition of Savings Banks, 
SEOULSHINMOON, June 14, 2011, http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20110614008010. 
14 Choi, Young-joo, The Influence of Large Shareholder in Savings Bank Insolvency and Regulation, 
53 PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 193, 194 (2012). 
15 Supra note 2.  
16 Supra note 14, at 194. 
17 Id.  
18 Supra note 5, at 7.   
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
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time, mutual credit unions engaged in several illegal activities, and their business 
became competitive among many financial institutions, including the commercial 
banking industry.22 In an effort to resolve these problems, the Korean government 
eventually approved the change of title from mutual credit unions to mutual savings 
banks.23 The government hoped to promote the savings bank industry and help them 
to compete with other financial institutions.24 Interestingly, since the title change, 
mutual savings banking has flourished.25  
 Since 2002, after the title change, savings banks were able to expand their 
business, including Project Financing (PF).26 Project financing is a term that refers to 
the financing method widely used for infrastructure, including plant construction, 
resource development, road building, port construction, and other large-scale 
investment projects. 27  Unlike general loans, project financing’s distinctive 
characteristic is that the source of payment is the sales price of, or profits from, the 
products that are yielded from the project.28 In addition, project financing is backed 
by project assets.29 Therefore, the borrower’s wealth and trust, and/or a third-party 
suretyship, become secondary, and the parties to the project assume the overall 
22 Id.  
23 See id. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Supra note 14, at 202.  
27 KANG, BYEONG-HO & KIM, SEOK-DONG, FINANCIAL MARKETS 143 (13th ed. 2013). 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
10 
 
                                           
success of the project, namely the completion of work, production, and sale.30 The 
payment of project financing is limited to the cash flow from the project itself.31 A 
main feature of the debt payment is that it is either non-recourse, where the lender 
cannot request the business owner for payment, or limited recourse, where the 
lender’s claim is limited to a certain amount of the loan.32 The major parties to 
project financing are business owners, project developers, and lenders.33 In this sense, 
the title change was the first cause of the savings bank crisis.34 
C.  The Korean Financial Regulatory System  
Prior to the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, the Korean regulatory system 
was divided into separate parts for bank financial institutions, non-bank financial 
institutions, securities, and insurance.35 However, in order to effectively cope with 
several changes after the foreign exchange crisis, such as financial liberalization, 
deregulation, and globalization, the Korean government considered consolidating the 
financial supervisory system.36 Soon after, the Act on the Establishment, etc. of 
Financial Supervisory Organizations was passed on December 29, 1997.37 Under the 
Act, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established on April 1, 1998, 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 See infra text accompanying p. 17 for more information of title changes. 
35 KWON, SUNG-HOON ET AL., FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY INTRODUCTION OF FSS, 20 (2013). 
36 Id. at 21.  
37 Id.  
11 
 
                                           
and the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) was established on January 2, 1999.38 
On February 29, 2008, in order to distinguish between financial supervision and 
supervisory execution for efficient supervision, the government revised the above Act, 
and approved the establishment of the Financial Services Commission.39 Following 
the revised Act, the Financial Supervisory Commission was changed to the Financial 
Services Commission.40  
 The Financial Services Commission deliberates on and resolves important 
issues concerning the financial system, financial policy, the supervision and regulation 
of financial companies, and operation approval for financial companies. 41  The 
Commission consists of nine members: the chairman, vice chairman, vice minister of 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Governor of Financial Supervisory Services, the 
vice Governor of the Bank of Korea, the CEO of the Korea Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, two finance experts recommended by the chairman, and one 
representative of the Korean economy recommended by the chairman of the Korea 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.42  
 The Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) is a no-capital special legal entity 
that was created to advance the Korean financial industry, promote the stability of the 
financial market, establish healthy credit and fair financial transactions, and promote 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 21–2.  
40 Id.   
41 Id.   
42 Id.  
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the needs of finance demanders, including depositors and investors. 43  The 
organization is independent from the central and regional governments, and it has the 
character of a public corporate body in charge of public affairs.44 FSS was not 
established as a governmental body but as a public corporate body in order to ensure 
that the organization did not lose its autonomy to political pressure or by influence 
from the executive branch.45 Instead, the FSS is meant to function as a neutral and 
professional supervisory body.46 FSS consists of the Governor, four or fewer vice 
Governor(s), nine or fewer vice Governor-to-be, and one auditor. 47  Under the 
instructions from the Financial Services Commission and Securities and Futures 
Commission, FSS audits and regulates financial companies’ work and assets, and also 
provides protection for financial consumers.48 FSS is related to the Bank of Korea, 
where the currency and trust policy is set and managed, and to the Korea Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, where the deposit insurance fund is managed. The three 
organizations have their own rights and roles in order to promote cooperation, and 
serve as checks among themselves.49 
 Korean financial institutions consist of bank financial institutions, non-bank 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Id.   
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 23.  
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financial institutions, financial investment firms, and insurance firms. 50  First, 
commercial banks and specialized banks are both considered bank financial 
institutions, which basically receive deposits and make loans.51 Commercial banks 
are divided into three types: nationwide, local, and foreign exchange banks. 52 
Specialized banks include the Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea, 
Agriculture Cooperative Association, and the National Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperative Association.53  
 Second, non-bank financial institutions exist to provide financial services for 
low-income people within different areas. 54  Savings banks; credit unions; new 
community finance associations; agriculture, fisheries, and forestry cooperative 
associations; the Export-Import Bank of Korea; and post offices are examples.55 
Third, under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, financial 
investment firms are entities that run all or part of an investment trading business, 
investment brokerage business, collective investment business, investment advisory 
business, discretionary investment business, or trust business.56 Under this Act, the 
term “institutions related to financial investment business” includes financial 
securities companies, merchant banks, financial brokerage companies, and short-term 
50 Id. at 25.  
51 KANG, BYEONG-HO ET AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 305 (19th ed. 2013). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 308.  
54 Id. at 378.  
55 Id. at 380–384.  
56 Supra note 35, at 27.  
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financial companies.57 Last, an insurance company is a financial company whose 
fundamental function is to fulfill the increased demand in assets in the case of insured 
accidents.58 The common pool of funds is created by collecting a certain amount of 
money from each insurance holder according to a statistical calculation using the law 
of large numbers.59 The purpose of insurance is to eliminate or decrease many 
economic actors’ fear of financial harm due to accidents.60 There are also financial 
holding companies.61 
D.  Why Are Savings Banks Needed? 
 For almost forty years, low-income individuals and small businesses have 
enjoyed the less stringent loan requirements of savings banks than those of 
commercial banks.62 In this sense, if Korean savings banks disappear as a result of 
the recent crisis, low-income individuals and small businesses may have a hard time 
getting loans, and may have no choice but to earn lower rates on deposits from 
commercial banks. If there are no savings banks in Korea, huge confusion may result 
in the Korean financial market. 
 Savings banks are certainly needed in Korea for several reasons.63 First, as 
mentioned previously, low-income people rely on savings banks to borrow money 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 32.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 32–3.  
61 Id. at 34.  
62 See supra note 2.  
63 KIM, YOUNG-PHIL, WHY DID SAVINGS BANKS GO BANKRUPT? 145 (2012). 
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because commercial banks are not willing to offer loans to them because of their 
credit status.64 Next, in order to maintain a healthy financial system, large and local 
commercial banks, savings banks, and other financial institutions should exist 
together.65 Some critics may argue that commercial banks can perform the role of 
savings banks for low-income people and small companies.66 However, this would 
likely be difficult because commercial banks were established to provide financial 
services for big companies and for society in general rather than for low-income 
people.67 An analogy for the coexistence of financial institutions would be that of the 
retail market. Big markets, such as Kroger, Target, or Macy’s are very convenient, and 
they sometimes provide better and cheaper products to consumers than small shops 
do.68 Based on this fact alone, it may seem that people do not need smaller shops.69 
However, that is not true because a monopoly by the big markets would result in 
harmful effects.70 In other words, bigger and smaller financial institutions must 
coexist and supplement each other. 71  This coexistence would most benefit 
64 See id. at 144–5; Kim, Young-phil, Financial Regulation Is Worse Than Low Interest Rates: Finding 
Financial Roles For Ordinary People Is The Point, HANKOOKI.COM, Feb. 19, 2013, 
http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/finance/201302/e20130219174403120130.htm. 
65 KIM, at 145. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 See id. at 144.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 145.  
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consumers.72  
E.  Causes of the Crisis 
 As mentioned above, there are several causes of the current savings bank 
crisis. The major causes of the current savings bank crisis are weak regulations, 
inappropriate acquirements of the failed savings banks, and owners’ moral hazard.73 
The title change and delayed restructuring are also to blame.74  
The title change was the very first cause of the savings bank crisis.75 With 
the new title, savings banks, the credit unions appeared much more reliable. Seeking 
high-risk and high-return investments with the new title, the owners of savings banks 
tried to make illegal connections with regulators and the government for less 
regulation and more favorable policy.76 Consequently, loose regulation following the 
title change allowed the owners to use their savings banks for personal purposes, 
resulting in moral hazard.77 In addition to the title change, the government also 
increased the deposit insurance of savings banks from $20,000 to $50,000.78 This 
increased deposit insurance also allowed savings bank owners to invest in high-risk 
and high-return activities.79  
72 See id.  
73 Supra note 5. 
74 Id. at 7–9.  
75 See id. at 7.  
76 See id.  
77 Supra note 14, at 201.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
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Many owners, board members of savings banks, and regulators were indicted 
and some were arrested under charges of bribery, embezzlement, and other 
activities.80 Im-suk, the owner of Solomon savings bank, the largest savings bank at 
that time, was arrested for bribery, embezzlement, and illegal loans following the 
suspension of the bank in 2012.81 Kim Chan-kyoung, the owner of Mirae savings 
bank was also arrested for bribery, embezzlement, and illegal loans.82 Im-suk was 
arrested for embezzling about $19 million and for illegal loans totaling around $141 
million, and Kim Chan-kyoung was arrested for illegal loans totaling about $380 
million and for embezzling more than $200 million.83 Many owners of other savings 
banks were arrested for similar charges.84 As for savings bank regulators, many of 
them were arrested for receiving bribes.85 In this sense, the moral hazard of several 
savings bank owners and the illegal connections between savings banks and 
regulators were one of the main reasons for the crisis. 
The illegal activities committed by savings bank owners were possible due to 
80 Yeo, Tae-kyoung, Senior Regulators at the FSS Received Heavy Sentences due to Bribe from 
Savings Banks, NEWS1, April 23, 2013, http://news1.kr/articles/1102559; Lee, Ga-young, 62 People in 
Political Circles were Arrested for Savings Banks Suspicion, JOINSMSN, Feb. 28, 2013, 
http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=10809008&cloc=olink|article|default. 
81 Supra note 63, at 27–9.  
82 Id. at 56–61.  
83 Id. at 29; Lee, Jae-dong, Kim Was Sentenced For 9 Years, MOONHWA, Jan. 25, 2013, 
http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=20130125MW161057215015. 
84 Id. at 29–56, 63–68.  
85 Supra note 80; Jung, Hye-jin, Another FSS Regulator Was Arrested Due To A Suspicion of The 
Pusan Savings Bank, SBSNEWS, May 9, 2011, 
http://news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?news_id=N1000910449 (stating that two regulators 
at the FSS were arrested for bribe, and prosecutors had plans to issue summons against 30 more 
regulators at the FSS).  
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the governance of savings banks in Korea.86 Unlike the commercial banking industry, 
only an owner could own savings banks allowing the owner to control a savings bank 
for private purposes, including illegal activities.87 The government allowed a single 
owner to control a savings bank because savings banks in Korea were relatively 
smaller than commercial banks, and were thought to pose less of a financial risk.88 
However, as savings banks have become bigger, they may pose an even larger risk 
than small commercial banks do.   
 Another reason for the crisis was weak regulation. 89  Applying loose 
regulations to savings banks may seem appropriate because savings banks are small-
scale financial institutions for ordinary people.90 The government allowed savings 
banks to expand their business models by relaxing credit lines and other regulations.91 
With these relaxed regulations, however, savings banks could pursue high-risk and 
high-return investment, such as PF, one of the biggest reasons for the crisis.92 
Specifically, in 2006, the government created a policy that savings banks did not have 
to keep any limitation on loans of up to $8 million, as long as savings banks kept to 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ratio. 93  Internationally, the 
86 See supra note 14, at 207. 
87 See id.  
88 See id. at 195. 
89 Id. at 202–3.  
90 Id. at 195.  
91 See supra note 5, at 8.  
92 See id.  
93 Id.  
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recommendation of BIS’s Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been adopted 
as the regulatory standard for a bank’s capital adequacy.94 The Committee mandates 
BIS member nations to maintain an equity capital rate of 8% or higher (the BIS rate), 
and non-members, in the hopes of increasing international recognition of their 
national banking industry, also abide by the rate.95  
 The Korean government applied the BIS ratio less stringently to savings 
banks (capital adequacy ratio of 5%) than the commercial banking industry, which 
was required to meet the BIS capital adequacy ratio of 8%.96 This may be an 
appropriate policy because commercial banks are much bigger in size and have more 
diverse business models than savings banks. However, savings banks tried to create a 
good capital adequacy ratio by selling subordinated bonds.97 Because subordinated 
bonds are counted as equity capital, but not liabilities, savings banks thoughtlessly 
tried to sell the bonds to make it seem as if their capital adequacy ratio was 
adequate.98 Therefore, applying the BIS ratio to savings banks may not be effective 
regulation. 
 More importantly, since the current savings bank crisis, the government has 
tried to solve the crisis by persuading healthy and strong financial holding companies 
94 Supra note 51, at 332–3.  
95 Id. at 332.  
96 See Lee, Sang-deok, What is the BIS Rate?, IGOODNEWS, Sept. 26, 2012, 
http://www.igoodnews.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=36205.   
97 Supra note 5, at 8.  
98 Id.  
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and savings banks to take over insolvent savings banks.99 During this process, the 
government provided several benefits to acquirers because most acquirers were 
hesitant to take over insolvent financial institutions.100 Governments can save public 
funds if financial institutions take over failed banks instead. This is because as healthy 
and strong financial institutions take over failed savings banks, the government does 
not need to spend public funds to rescue insolvent banks. The Korean government 
preferred this method of solving the crisis. However, this method may be mistaken 
because acquirers still struggle to normalize poor savings banks and their future 
remains in jeopardy.101 Therefore, the attempt of the government to save insolvent 
savings banks may cause a much bigger crisis in the future as the U.S. government 
already experienced during the Savings and Loans Crisis of the 1980s.102  
F.  The Future of Korean Savings Banks 
 Savings banks have been providing financial services for low-income people 
in Korea since the 1970s. 103  However, because commercial banking industries 
perform very similar roles to savings banks, savings banks have faced several 
problems in maintaining their businesses.104 Also, since the savings bank crisis, the 
99 Supra note 14, at 202–3.  
100 See id.  
101 Kang, supra note 9.  
102 1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 186–7 (1997) (stating it was a bad solution for the U.S. government to bailout the insolvent 
savings associations. If the government closed them instead, it could have spent much less than $160 
billion). 
103 See supra note 2.  
104 See supra note 14, at 195. It states that the finance industry is typically divided into three parts in 
Korea: banks, insurance, and financial investment (securities), and that commercial banks and savings 
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savings bank industry is considered a poor financial institution.105 In response, the 
Korean government is trying to change savings banks’ title from savings banks back 
to mutual credit unions.106 If the title changes to mutual credit unions, the savings 
bank industry would find it even harder to operate their business.107 
 Because savings banks met difficulties in maintaining their businesses, they 
tried to invest in high-risk, high-return ventures.108 Several owners of savings banks 
also tried to engage in high-risk and high-return investments, so they took advantage 
of weak regulations and bribed savings bank regulators for less supervision.109 
Savings banks need to go back to basics and not invest in high-risk and high-return 
ventures.110 In addition, the savings bank industry needs to have its own regulation 
and supervision so that the government can create a more sound and secure savings 
bank system.111 
banks have almost identical businesses because savings and loans are the main businesses for both 
institutions.  
105 Jung, Hyun-soo, Savings Banks Restructuring Causes Else Victims, MONEYTODAY, Mar. 28, 2013, 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2013032714525710903&outlink=1. 
106 Kwon, Soon-woo, Congress Pushes Ahead With A Bill to Change Title of Savings Banks, MTN, 
June 22, 2012, http://news.mtn.co.kr/newscenter/news_viewer.mtn?gidx=2012062209554856828. 
107 Bang, Young-deok, Savings Banking Industry, There Are Ten Reasons to Object The Change of The 
Title, MKNEWS, Sept. 24, 2012, http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2012&no=616267. 
108 See supra note 14, at 195. 
109 See supra note 80. 
110 See supra note 63, at 151–3. 
111 Id. at 150.  
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III.  ORIGINS OF THE 1980S SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 
A.  Short Explanation of the Savings and Loan Crisis   
 Thrifts, mainly referring to savings and loan associations (S&Ls), gained a 
significant portion of the U.S. financial industry by acquiring the largest share of 
mortgage business among financial institutions despite the thrift crisis.1 S&Ls receive 
deposits and grant loans to local residents, including home financing loans.2 The 
thrift industry has therefore been serving the important role of providing financial 
services to local residents and contributing to local home development.3  
One of the biggest financial crises, the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L Crisis), 
occurred in the U.S. during the 1980s.4 Several causes contributed to the S&L Crisis 
including: a harsh financial environment, deregulation, rapid growth, high-risk and 
high-return investment, and regulatory forbearance.5 This debacle had very serious 
negative effects on the financial industry as well as the U.S. economy.6 From 1980 to 
1988, 560 thrifts failed, and there were 333 supervisory mergers and 798 voluntary 
mergers.7 The peak of the crisis occurred from 1981 to 1982 when 493 voluntary and 
1 LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S & L DEBACLE 13 (1991).    
2 Id. at 14.                  
3 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02[D] (2d ed. 2011). 
4 Supra note 1, at 3.   
5  NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, 
ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 6–10 (1993).  
6 JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 24 (1991). 
7 1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 169 (1997). 
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259 supervisory mergers took place for insolvent thrifts.8 Moreover, the insurance 
corporation for thrifts, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), 
was unable to appropriately resolve the crisis because it did not have enough fiscal 
resources to handle the increasing number of insolvent thrifts.9 Due to the crisis, the 
FSLIC soon ran out of money.10 As the above figures show, the S&L Crisis is 
appropriately described as a disaster. 
In order to solve the crisis, the U.S. government supported the FSLIC’s 
attempt to decrease the number of insolvent thrifts by enacting the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act of 1987. 11  Despite the assistance, 250 thrifts were still 
insolvent.12 Beginning in 1989, the Bush administration tried resolving the crisis by 
enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA).13  Pursuant to these Acts, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
and the FSLIC were abolished, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
became newly responsible for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the 
Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF).14 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
8 Id. at 168.   
9 Supra note 1, at 135.                
10 Supra note 7, at 173.  
11 Id. at 186–188.    
12 Id. at 186.   
13 Id. at 187–188.  
14 Id. at 188.   
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was also created to regulate the thrift industry on behalf of the FHLBB.15  
B.  History of the Thrift Industry 
 The thrift industry consists of three institutions: savings banks, savings and 
loan associations, and thrift holding companies.16 Prior to 1980, only two savings 
institutions existed: savings and loan associations and savings banks.17 Interestingly, 
most U.S. savings banks have been located on the East Coast unlike savings and loan 
associations, which have been spread across the U.S.18 The first savings banks were 
established in both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts in 1816, and were created in 
order to encourage savings.19 A federal savings bank charter did not exist until 
1978.20 Two forms of savings banks exist: the mutual savings bank and the stock 
savings bank.21 The former is made up of depositors who serve as the board of 
trustees, and who share in all of the bank’s profits.22 Unlike mutual savings banks, 
stock savings banks are corporations with stockholders serving as the board of 
15 Robert Cooper, The Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S363 (1991). 
16 DONALD J. TOUMEY, BASICS OF BANKING LAW 25–28, 39 (1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(1) (stating 
that “savings association means (A) any Federal savings association; (B) any State savings association; 
(C) any corporation (other than a bank) that the Board of Directors and the Comptroller of the Currency 
jointly determine to be operating in substantially the same manner as a savings association”). 
17 Supra note 1.             
18 Supra note 3, at § 1.02[C].  
19 LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 82 
(4th ed. 2011). 
20 Id.               
21 Supra note 3, at § 1.02[C].  
22 Id.    
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directors.23 Prior to 1982, there were only state-chartered savings institutions, but 
pursuant to the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, savings institutions 
could be chartered under federal law as well.24  
 Savings and loan associations make up the largest portion of the thrift 
industry.25 The first savings and loan association, the Oxford Provident Building 
Association, was created in Frankford, Pennsylvania, in 1831.26 The purpose of 
savings and loan associations is to provide financial services for individuals, unlike 
the commercial banking industry, which mainly provides financial services for 
businesses.27 At that time, savings associations in Frankford were geographically 
limited to conducting business, such as offering mortgage loans, within five miles of 
that area.28 However, the growth of the thrift industry in the 1990s helped slacken the 
geographic restriction.29 Initially, savings institutions were also limited to mortgage 
lending only, but after the deregulation of the thrift industry in the early 1980s, 
savings institutions were able to provide various financial services in addition to 
mortgage lending.30 Similar to savings banks, savings and loan associations have 
23 Id.    
24 Id.    
25 Id. at § 1.02[D].  
26 Supra note 6, at 9.  
27 Supra note 19, at 72.  
28 Supra note 6, at 9.     
29 See id. at 11.        
30 Supra note 3, at § 1.02[D].  
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federally chartered and state-chartered associations.31 Two forms of savings and loan 
associations exist as well, mutual or stock.32 Since 1980, mutual savings and loan 
associations have tended to switch their form to stock because stock associations 
could make greater profits, including public offerings of stock.33  
The main purpose of thrifts is to provide financial services to local residents 
and to assist in housing market development.34 As a result, residential mortgage loans 
were the key part of the thrift industry, and comprised over two thirds of their total 
assets.35 Because savings institutions invested mostly in mortgage loans and needed 
to follow the Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL) test, the thrift industry was vulnerable to 
downturns in the housing market and economy. 36  Although the thrift industry 
suffered from the harsh circumstances mentioned above, the industry is still needed 
by financial consumers.37  
C.  Why Are Savings Institutions Needed? 
Savings institutions promote savings and make loans to local residents for 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Supra note 6, at 10.   
35 Supra note 1.    
36 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 33 (2009); 
Morrison & Foerster, Thrift Institutions after Dodd-Frank: The New Regulatory Framework (Dec. 2011) 
at 24, available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/111208-Thrift-Institutions-User-
Guide.pdf (complying with the Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL) requires thrifts to invest at least 65 
percent of their total assets in residential mortgage lending).  
37 See supra note 1.   
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homes, and therefore, thrifts promote local housing development. 38  The thrift 
industry has likely played a significant role in promoting local home financing 
because other financial institutions might have been unwilling to provide the service. 
Unlike savings institutions, the commercial banking industry comprises the greatest 
portion of the financial industry, but its main purpose is to provide financial services 
to mid to large-sized companies. 39  The two government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), were established to stimulate 
mortgage loans by purchasing mortgages from financial institutions.40 However, the 
GSEs may not be helpful for people who want to purchase a home, because the GSEs 
have been under conservatorship since the mortgage crisis of 2008.41  
In addition, thrifts are necessary to promote competition in the financial 
industry because in order to attract customers, each financial institution will provide 
better and more convenient services to its customers. 42  If thrifts disappear, 
commercial banks may exclusively provide financial services to local residents 
placing higher rates and stricter requirements on loans. Small companies and local 
residents may have trouble accessing financial services as big banks are often 
38 See supra note 6, at 10 (stating that “the institution economized on information and transactions 
costs by consolidating the savings of a group of local individuals and rechanneling the funds to the 
same individuals in the form of home mortgage loans”).     
39 BENTON E. GUP & JAMES W. KOLARI, COMMERCIAL BANKING: THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 8 (3rd ed. 
2005). 
40 Supra note 19, at 329.  
41 Id. at 330–331.   
42 See id. at 204 (stating that “banks already are facing increasing competition from non-banks that 
offer payment services that build upon the bank supplied payments system, but add features that 
provide customers additional information, convenience, and timeliness”).  
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criticized for rejecting loans to small local businesses.43 Such rejections may have 
adverse effects on the community as a whole, and this situation will worsen if thrifts 
cease to exist. 
D.  U.S. Financial Systems 
1.  The Dual Banking System 
The U.S. government has chosen the dual banking system, made up of federal 
and state charters, since the Civil War.44 With the dual banking system, financial 
institutions can choose either a federal or state charter.45 The purpose of the dual 
banking system selected by the U.S. government is to promote a sound and safe 
banking environment with competition between federal authority and state authority.46 
However, it has been argued whether the dual banking system is an appropriate 
system for the U.S.47 Due to countless overlaps between federal law and state law, 
conflicts have arisen between these two systems.48 In order to solve the overlap 
problem, the U.S. government conferred primacy to federal financial institutions; 
43  155 CONG. REC. H 14747, 14749 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (statement of Reps. Schauer). 
Congressman Schauer from Michigan criticized that “big banks have decided to stop lending to 
Michigan homeowners and Michigan businesses.” He also pointed out that “employers can’t get loan 
they need to bring people back to work.” 
44 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
45 Id.    
46 JONATHAN R. MACEY AT EL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 12 (3d ed. 2001); supra note 19, at 68 
(“a system of regulatory arbitrage where the most favored regulator and most favored rules of 
regulation may be easily selected by the regulated entity. On the other hand, this may result in healthy 
competition by the regulatory entities to provide effective regulatory oversight”). 
47 Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, Is There a Dual Banking System? 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
30, 32 (2008). 
48 JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 120.  
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federal law can preempt state law when federal law and state law conflict.49 In 
response, several financial institutions switched to the federal charter to take 
advantage of the preemption rule.50 However, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), preemption has been 
removed except for three exceptions.51       
2.  U.S. Financial Regulatory System 
Because the U.S. has the dual banking system, there are two regulatory 
systems, federal and state.52 There are also different regulatory structures for the 
commercial banking industry, thrift industry, credit union, and others.53 After many 
crises, several Acts were passed to establish different regulatory agencies to foster a 
strong and secure financial industry.54  
 
<Table 1> “Systemic Crises and the Creation of Financial Regulators”55 
49 Id.  
50 See supra note 19, at 212 (stating that “a significant benefit of a national bank charter the ability to 
use the National Bank Act to preempt state laws”). 
51 Id. (federal preemption is effective only if one of the following three exceptions are met: “if a state 
consumer financial law’s application would have a discriminatory effect on national banks in 
comparison with a bank chartered by that state it is preempted; if applying the Supreme Court’s 
standard in the Barnett Bank case, the state consumer financial law “prevents or significantly interferes 
with the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” as determined by a court or by an OCC regulation 
or order on a case-by-case basis, it is preempted; if the state consumer financial law is preempted by a 
provision of a Federal law other than this portion of the Dodd–Frank Act”).  
52 JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 70–72.  
53 Supra note 19, at 114, 184.      
54 Id. at 67.    
55 Mark Jickling & Edward V. Murphy, Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of U.S. Financial 
30 
 
                                           
Supervision, Congressional Research Service, Order Code R40249 (Dec. 14, 2009) at 4 (citing CRS). 
Systemic Event Perceived Problem Solution New Regulator Year Created 
Panic of 1857 Failure of Private 
Clearinghouses that 
Processed State 
Bank Notes 
(Circulated as 
currency) 
Create Single 
National Currency 
Through System of 
Federally 
Chartered and 
Regulated Banks 
Office of the 
Comptroller of the 
Currency 
(OCC) 
1863 
Panic of 1907 Series of Runs on 
Banks and 
Financial Trusts 
with Inadequate 
Reserves 
Create Lender of 
Last Resort with 
Power to Regulate 
a National System 
of Bank Reserves 
Federal Reserve 1913 
Great Depression Series of Runs on 
Banks by Small 
Depositors who 
Feared Full Value 
of Deposits Would 
Not be Honored 
 
Sharp Decline in 
Stock Prices along 
with Widespread 
Belief that Some 
Investors had an 
Information 
Advantage 
Reduced 
Confidence in 
Securities Markets 
Create Limited 
Deposit Insurance 
to Maintain 
Depositor 
Confidence and 
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Various financial regulatory agencies charter, examine, and regulate the 
commercial banking industry.56 There are also different bank regulatory structures 
depending on the bank organization.57 First, the Office of the Comptrollers of the 
Currency (OCC), the oldest federal regulator, is responsible for chartering and 
regulating all national banks.58 The OCC is a branch of the Treasury Department.59 
The President with Senate confirmation appoints the comptroller of the OCC, and his 
or her term is for five years.60 The OCC’s budget derives from assessment fees paid 
by its regulated financial institutions.61 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC is 
additionally responsible for regulating all federally chartered thrifts and has become 
the rulemaking authority of all thrifts.62 
Next, the Federal Reserve System (FRS) consists of “a seven-member board 
of governors, twelve regional Federal Reserve banks, and the Federal Open Market 
Committee.”63 The FRS is responsible for regulatory and monetary policies, and it 
supervises the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB), all state-member banks, and bank 
holding companies, including stipulating regulations for consumer protection.64 One 
56 Supra note 19, at 184.   
57 Id.   
58 JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 70.        
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Carol Beaumier et al., Protiviti, U.S. Regulatory Reform – Impact on the Thrift Industry, available at 
http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/POV/POV-US-Regulatory-Reform-Thrift.pdf. 
63 JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 71.   
64 Id.        
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important function that the Federal Reserve Banks perform is that when financial 
depository institutions need emergency funds, the institutions can borrow money from 
the Banks as a last resort.65 The central role of the Federal Open Market Committee 
is to set monetary policy, and it “consist[s] of the seven members of the board of 
governors and five Federal Reserve Bank presidents.”66 The President not only 
appoints the board members in the board of governors with Senate confirmation for 
fourteen-year terms, but also nominates a member for a chair as the executive head of 
the board.67 The FRB earns interest from its government securities portfolio, and 
covers its expenses by such earnings.68 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FRB has 
additional authority to regulate thrift holding companies and non-depository 
institution subsidiaries.69  
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) consists of a five-member 
board of directors. One of the members is the comptroller of the OCC, and another is 
the director of the OTS.70 The remaining members are appointed by the President 
with Senate confirmation for a six-year term. 71 The FDIC maintains a healthy 
financial industry by insuring bank and thrift deposits, and by regulating state 
65 Id.     
66 Id.     
67 Id.   
68 Id.   
69 V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 2, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf. 
70 JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 72.   
71 Id.   
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nonmember banks. 72  The FDIC acts as a receiver or conservator of insolvent 
financial institutions, and maintains its budget from the deposit insurance funds.73  
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the corporation is additionally responsible for 
supervising and examining state thrift institutions.74 
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) consists of a chair and 
two members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation for six-year terms, 
and has the authority to charter and regulate federal credit unions, and federally 
insured state credit unions, including implementing the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund.75 The NCUA operates its own budget through the share insurance 
fund.76  
In addition to the NCUA, each state has their own regulatory agencies, which 
regulate and charter financial institutions.77 Last, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, a 
new regulatory agency, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP), will 
regulate only those financial institutions whose assets are over $10 billion. 78 
Although the BCFP belongs to the FRB, the agency is independent.79 The President 
with Senate confirmation appoints an independent Director, who will be not only a 
72 Id. at 71.  
73 Id. at 71–2.  
74 Supra note 69.  
75 JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 72.   
76 Id.            
77 Id.        
78 Supra note 19, at 370.  
79 Id.  
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member of FSOC, but also on the board of directors of the FDIC.80 The BCFP was 
created to allow financial consumers to access “fair, transparent, and competitive 
financial services and products,” and it is “funded by annual transfers from the 
earnings of the Fed, rather than assessments from the regulated entities, and insulated 
from the political appropriations process.”81 
3.  U.S. Financial Depository Institutions 
Commercial banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions are three different 
types of depository institutions in the U.S.82 Commercial banks are either federally or 
state chartered, and serve various financial services to individuals and business 
groups.83 Thrift institutions are also classified as federal savings associations, state 
savings associations, or thrift holding companies.84 Thrifts were established to serve 
financial services to residents in the housing market. 85 Credit Unions are also 
federally or state chartered, and their main role is to make loans to its members.86 
E.  The Savings and Loan Crisis 
1.  Causes of the S&L Crisis 
(a)  Economic circumstances 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 DONALD, supra note 16, at 9–29.  
83 Id. at 9.  
84 Id. at 25–29.  
85 Id. at 25.  
86 Id. at 29.  
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As mentioned previously, the Savings and Loan Crisis was one of the biggest 
financial crises in the U.S.87 Several causes gave rise to the crisis, one being the 
economic circumstances at the time.88 Inflation caused the U.S. thrift industry to face 
serious trouble during the 1970s.89 The U.S. government increased interest rates in 
order to overcome the inflation.90 As a result, the thrift industry faced difficulties, 
experiencing a serious imbalance between interest rates and balance sheets. 91 
Because of the unique business structure of thrifts, including short-term deposits and 
long-term mortgage loans with fixed interest rates, thrifts were vulnerable to the 
inflation and to the rapid increase of interest rates.92 This side effect of inflation had 
the greatest impact on the thrift industry in 1980.93  
Thrifts also met business problems due to competition from other financial 
institutions, including money market mutual funds (MMMFs), because the MMMFs 
became more attractive than thrifts for investors.94 The MMMFs could provide high 
87 Supra note 1, at 3.                
88 Robert J. Laughlin, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S301, S303 
(1991); for a discussion of other factors that contributed to the S&L crisis see Carl Felsenfeld, The 
Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S28 (1991).  
89 See Robert, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle at S303; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (9th 
ed. 2009) (stating that inflation means: “A general increase in prices coinciding with a fall in the real 
value of money”). 
90 Robert, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle at S304.  
91 Supra note 7, at 168.  
92 Supra note 1, at 53 (stating that “There was, however, one flaw in this pattern: Thrifts were taking in 
short-term deposits but making long-term, fixed-interest-rate mortgage loan. If interest rates increased 
significantly, they would be squeezed”); actually most S&Ls were insolvent in 1981 due to the unique 
business, fixed-rate mortgage loan for long term and deposits for short term, supra note 6, at 38.   
93 Robert, supra note 88, at S304.    
94 See supra note 1, at 68. 
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interest rates on deposits, especially on large denomination Certificate Deposits (CDs), 
without limitation because the Regulation Q ceilings did not cover the denomination 
CDs.95 Thus, investors could profit from the CDs. In order to attract investors and to 
compete with the MMMFs, thrifts should have paid higher interest rates on deposits 
than MMMFs.96 The thrift industry faced operating losses, or lost their depositors to 
the MMMFs.97 In addition to these circumstances and the new competition, the thrift 
industry is vulnerable to conditions of the housing market because thrifts must invest 
at least 65% of their assets into residential mortgage lending.98 With this limitation, 
the thrift industry may face severe difficulties whenever the real estate market falls.99    
 (b)  Deregulation 
Deregulation is also one of the significant reasons for the S&L Crisis.100 
Because of the increased interest rates and competition, savings institutions had a hard 
time operating their businesses.101 In response to the difficulties facing the thrift 
industry, the U.S. government relaxed regulations on the thrift industry in the hopes 
that the industry would recover.102 Deregulation policies were prevalent in the early 
95 Id; The thrift industry was limited by the Fed to pay interest rates on deposits; thrifts could not serve 
higher interest rates on deposits than the MMMFs did. See NED EICHLER, THE THRIFT DEBACLE 23 
(1989). 
96 WHITE, THE S & L DEBACLE, at 69.  
97 Id. at 70.  
98 Supra note 36.  
99 Id.      
100 Supra note 5, at 7.      
101 Supra note 1, at 67–68.     
102 See supra note 7, at 173.   
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1980s.103 First, the FHLBB eased capital requirements for thrifts from five percent to 
four percent in 1980, and then to three percent in 1982.104 Because the government 
reduced the capital requirement, thrifts could avoid being insolvent.105 In addition to 
the low capital requirement, the FHLBB allowed thrifts to use two accounting 
principles to give the appearance that thrifts were solvent.106 The first principle that 
thrifts could abuse was the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).107 By 
abusing the GAAP, thrifts could show they were sound, safe, and profitable despite 
the fact that they were insolvent.108 Another principle was regulatory accounting 
principles (RAP), which enabled thrifts to pretend that they had assets although the 
assets were already sold at a giveaway price.109 In short, the FHLBB took advantage 
of these two principles to overstate the condition of broke thrifts, but this exaggeration 
could not last long.110       
Following the deregulation policy, the U.S. government enacted two Acts, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) 
and the Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn–St Germain) to 
103 Id.     
104 Id.     
105 Id.     
106 Supra note 5, at 9.   
107 Id.  
108 Id. (stating that: “The abuses, involving such arcane issues as treatment of goodwill, booking of 
fees and interest as current income although payment was to be received in the future, and 
understatement of likely bad debts, allowed insolvent S&Ls to look healthy and failing ones to look 
profitable”). 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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assist the troubled thrift industry.111 DIDMCA lowered net worth requirements of 
insured accounts by substituting three to six percent for the existing five percent.112 
Actually, the FHLBB had authority to determine the percentage pursuant to the Act.113 
DIDMCA also eliminated limitations so that thrifts could provide liberal interest rates 
on deposits by phasing out the Regulation Q.114 Pursuant to the Act, thrifts could start 
providing the negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) account. 115 Significantly, 
DIDMCA increased the amount of deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 to 
attract depositors.116 However, this increased deposit insurance led thrifts to pursue 
high-risk and high-return investments because even if thrifts went bankrupt, the 
FSLIC could protect each customer’s deposit up to $100,000.117 
The thrift industry was given more powers under the Garn–St Germain; the 
Act allowed thrifts to pursue non-traditional investments.118 This Act also granted 
priority to thrift-holding companies if they had conflicts with other laws when taking 
111 Supra note 7, at 175.    
112 Id.    
113 Id.    
114 Supra note 19, at 99. 
115 Id.    
116 Id.   
117 ROGER G. KORMENDI ET AL., CRISIS RESOLUTION IN THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 13 (1989). 
118 Supra note 19, at 100 (stating: “This Act expanded consumer loan authority for federal thrifts to 
thirty percent of assets and enlarged nonresidential real estate loan authority to forty percent of assets. 
Finally, the Act authorized federal thrifts to devote up to ten percent of assets to secured or unsecured 
loans for commercial purposes and to offer non-interest-bearing demand deposits to their commercial 
loan customers”). 
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over insolvent thrifts.119 Both DIDMCA and the Garn–St Germain gave authority to 
state-chartered thrifts to operate as federally chartered thrifts did.120 Also, thrifts 
began engaging in various activities that traditionally only commercial banks could 
engage in.121 The two Acts allowed thrifts to rapidly expand their investment by 
eliminating the interest rates on deposits.122 These Acts enabled thrifts to pursue 
high-risk and high-return investments causing moral hazard by raising the coverage of 
the deposit insurance.123 
The FHLBB also removed limitations with respect to ownership 
requirements.124 With the elimination of restrictions, swindlers could readily become 
owners of thrifts.125 Furthermore, the Reagan administration eased the regulatory 
environment on the thrift industry by lessening the size of regulatory agencies and by 
reducing intervention on the industry.126 Regulators and supervisors for thrifts were 
not of the same quality as regulators and supervisors for the commercial banking 
119 Id.  
120 Id.   
121  Id. (noting that the activities include “checking accounts, nonresidential real estate loans, 
nonmortgage consumer loans [including credit card loans], commercial loans, and the ability to 
exercise trust and fiduciary powers”). 
122 Supra note 7, at 176.     
123 Id.     
124 Supra note 5, at 37 (explaining the removed limitations that “it required at least 400 stock holders 
of which at least 125 had to be from the local community served by the S&L, and no individual could 
own more than 10 percent of stock and no “controlling group” more than 25 percent”). 
125 Id.  
126 Supra note 7, at 177.  
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industry.127 Regulators for thrifts received twenty to thirty percent less wages than the 
commercial banking regulators as well.128 The FHLBB cut the number of supervisors 
and regulators for the thrift industry from 1981 to 1984. 129  In addition, both 
examinations and examinations per billion dollars of assets on the thrift industry 
dropped sequentially between 1980 and 1984.130 As we can see from the tables below, 
a lack of regulation and supervision took place during this period while the assets of 
thrifts increased. 131  This inverse relationship significantly aggravated the poor 
condition of the thrift industry.132    
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 Id. at 170.        
128 Id. at 171.        
129 Supra note 1, at 88.    
130 Id.    
131 Id. at 88–89.        
132 Id. at 88.             
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<Table 2> “FHLBB Regulatory Resources, 1979-1984”133 
 Examination and 
Supervision Staff 
Examination and 
Supervision Budget 
(millions) 
1979 1,282 $41.0 
1980 1,308 $49.8 
1981 1,385 $52.8 
1982 1,379 $57.3 
1983 1,368 $62.5 
1984 1,337 $67.0 
<Table 3> “FSLIC-Insured Thrift Examinations, 1980-1984”134 
Examinations Number of 
FSLIC-
Insured 
Thrifts 
Thrift 
Industry 
Assets 
(billions) 
Examinations 
per Thrift 
Examinations 
per Billion 
Dollars of 
Assets 
1980 3,210 3,993 $593.8 5.41 
1981 3,171 3,751 $639.8 4.96 
1982 2,800 3,287 $686.2 4.08 
1983 2,131 3,146 $813.8 2.62 
1984 2,347 3,136 $976.9 2.40 
 
133 Id (citing Barth and Bradley (1989)). 
134 Id. at 89 (citing FHLBB date; Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1989)). 
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 (c)  Increased Deposit Insurance 
The deposit insurance system was created in the 1930s to maintain sound and 
safe conditions for financial markets, and to protect depositors.135 During the Great 
Depression, the Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) mainly for the commercial banking industry, and the National 
Housing Act of 1934 established the FSLIC for the thrift industry.136 However, thrifts 
deliberately abused the deposit insurance system not only to pursue high-risk 
investments, but also to charm depositors because their deposits were protected by 
insurance.137 With the deposit insurance, thrifts engaged in high-risk and high-return 
investment by relying on insurance guarantees when they became insolvent.138 In the 
1980s, the U.S. government increased the amount of the deposit insurance from 
$40,000 to $100,000, enabling thrifts to hold significant amounts of capital to sharply 
grow their businesses.139 If thrifts did not have the deposit insurance, they might not 
have engaged in high-risk and high-return investments. 140  Also, without the 
insurance, the S&L crisis might not have happened.141 
 (d)  Moral Hazard 
135 Barth and Bradley, Thrift Deregulation and Federal Deposit Insurance, J. OF FIN. SERV. RES. 231, 
254 (1989). 
136 See id.   
137 Supra note 5, at 5.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 6.    
140 Id. at 5.  
141 Id.   
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Moral hazard by managers or directors of thrifts is considered another reason 
for the S&Ls crisis. 142 Moral hazard is defined as “the incentives that insured 
institutions have to engage in higher-risk activities than they would without deposit 
insurance; deposit insurance means, as well, that insured depositors have no 
compelling reason to monitor the institution’s operations.” 143  In the 1980s, 
deregulation and increased deposit insurance enabled directors and managers of thrifts 
to pursue high-risk and high-return investments. 144  During this period, the 
government eased the restriction of ownership on savings institutions by removing a 
restriction that required savings institutions to keep at least 400 shareholders, at least 
125 of which had to be local residents of the location of the savings institution.145 
Also, one shareholder could not own more than ten percent of the total shares of a 
savings institution, or one group could not own more than twenty-five percent of the 
shares.146 However, after removing these restrictions, one person could own shares of 
savings institutions without any limitation.147 Removing these restrictions eventually 
allowed a shareholder to engage in illegal activities and bankrupt his or her savings 
institutions.148 In this sense, without deregulation and increased deposit insurance, 
moral hazard may not have happened at all. Moral hazard and lax regulations, 
142 Carl, supra note 88, at S34.  
143 Supra note 7, at 176.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 175. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 See id. 
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combined with increased coverage of deposit insurance, allowed thrifts to rapidly 
develop the industry into nontraditional activities, compared to previous years, which 
may have worsened the situation.149  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 Supra note 1, at 102, 106 (stating that: “Rapid growth by any business enterprise is likely to involve 
management and organizational problems; thrifts are no exception”). 
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<Table 4> “Holdings of “Nontraditional” Assets by FSLIC-Insured Thrifts, 1982 
and 1985”150 
 1982 1982 1985 1985 1985 
 Amount 
(billions) 
Percentage 
of 
Total Assets 
Amount 
(billions) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Assets 
Increase in 
Amount, 
1982–1985 
(billions) 
Commercial  
Mortgage 
loans 
$43.9 6.4% $98.4 9.2% $54.5 
Land loans 6.9 1.0 31.0 2.9 24.1 
Commercial 
loans 
0.7 0.1 16.0 1.5 15.2 
Consumer 
loans 
19.2 2.8 43.9 4.1 24.7 
Direct equity 
investments 
8.2 1.2 26.8 2.5 18.6 
Total $78.9 11.5% $216.1 20.2% $137.2 
  
 (e)  Delayed Policy & Mergers 
After the S&L Crisis, the U.S. government encouraged healthy institutions to 
150 Id. at 102 (citing Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich (1989)). 
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take over failed institutions in order to mitigate the crisis, but this method caused a 
much bigger outcome in which “the final cost of resolving failed S&Ls is estimated at 
just over $160 billion, including $132 billion from federal taxpayers —and much of 
this cost could have been avoided if the government had had the political will to 
recognize its obligation to depositors in the early 1980s, rather than viewing the 
situation as an industry bailout.” 151  If the government had closed the failed 
institutions instead of merging them with other prime institutions, it would have 
avoided these massive costs.152 In other words, the government could have avoided 
spending public funds to resolve the crisis.153 One reason for the merger policy was 
that the FSLIC had insufficient resources to close insolvent thrifts, and most 
congressmen trusted that bankrupt thrifts would recover with deregulation. 154 
Therefore, the U.S. government might have preferred the mergers rather than closing 
insolvent thrifts in order to save public funds and insufficient resources. However, the 
merger policy might not have been the correct decision in light of another crisis faced 
by mutual savings banks (MSBs).155 The FDIC, the insurance corporation for MSBs, 
was able to minimize damages by promptly closing failed MSBs.156   
2.  Result of the S&L Crisis 
151 See supra note 7, at 187.          
152 See id. at 169.             
153 Id.      
154 Id. at 173.    
155 Id. at 187.    
156 Id.          
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The S&L Crisis was one of the biggest crises in U.S. banking history.157 This 
crisis resulted in massive damages, including the insolvency of the thrift industry, the 
establishment of new statutes and regulatory systems, countless victims, and huge 
expenditures of public funds.158 Between 1980 and 1988, the number of savings and 
loan associations decreased by more than 1,000, and almost 5,000 S&Ls were 
insolvent; even the insurance corporation for S&Ls recorded deficits.159 During this 
period, there were more than 560 failed S&Ls, and more than 1,000 S&Ls were 
acquired through both supervisory and voluntary mergers.160 More than $160 billion 
was used to resolve the S&Ls crisis.161 Lastly, existing regulatory agencies and 
insurance corporations were abolished, and the Bush administration enacted the 
FIRREA, which abolished the FHLBB and the FSLIC, and gave new authority to the 
FDIC over the thrift industry.162 In addition, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
was established to regulate the whole thrift industry.163 
157 Id. at 167.  
158 See id. at 186.  
159 Id. at 168, 173.    
160 Id. at 169.      
161 Id.            
162 Id. at 186–188.   
163 Supra note 15.    
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IV.  EXAMPLES OF HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE THRIFT 
INDUSTRY 
 Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act increased 
regulatory standards for all financial institutions, including thrifts.1 The increased 
regulations include a higher capital requirement, new regulatory agencies, the QTL 
test, and the OTC derivatives.2 It has been asked whether the increased regulatory 
standards will adversely affect thrifts.3  
 The thrift industry was originally limited by regulations that prevented it from 
diversifying and dealing with large businesses, as its main purpose is to provide 
residential mortgage loans to residents. 4  Limitations preventing thrifts from 
expanding their business probably seemed appropriate in the 1960s because the thrift 
industry controlled about seventy-five percent of all home mortgage business. 5 
However, today’s thrift industry occupies less than twenty-five percent of the market, 
and given this changed condition, regulatory limitations may give rise to serious 
problems for the thrift industry. 6  If thrifts receive more intensive regulation, 
1 PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Thrifts & Thrift Holding Companies 1 (2011) (stating that the thrift 
industry will face more serious difficulty than any other financial institution due to the Dodd-Frank 
Act).  
2 Id. at 2–9.  
3 See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 
129 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that “It remains to be seem, however, whether the OCC will retain 
regulations that preserve the distinct character of federal savings associations, or whether those 
associations will voluntarily convert to a national bank charter”; “it also remains to be seen whether the 
OCC will issue or organizers will seek any new federal savings association charters”). 
4 Id. at 130.  
5 Supra note 1, at 2.  
6 See id.  
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including more limitations, there may not be any way for the industry to survive, let 
alone prosper. This may cause thrifts to disappear as they convert to banking charters 
to get more general lending powers.7  
A.  Higher Capital Requirement 
After the crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act started treating the thrift industry 
almost equal to the banking industry with respect to regulations, including capital 
requirements.8 This is because the more capital a financial institution has, the better 
they can buffer against unexpected financial difficulties.9 Greater capital creates safer 
alternatives to deal with sudden problems.10 On the other hand, the higher capital 
requirement may give rise to difficulties for the thrift industry. In addition to the 
regulations that prevent thrifts from having diverse business models, the increased 
capital requirement may cause the industry to lose existing business.11   
 In general, requiring higher capital can prevent financial institutions from 
expanding their assets. 12  The higher capital requirement will give competitive 
disadvantages to financial institutions, and cause them to fall behind their 
7 Supra note 3, at 118. 
8 See supra note 1, at 8. 
9 See id. 
10 BENTON E. GUP & JAMES W. KOLARI, COMMERCIAL BANKING: THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 345 (3rd 
ed. 2005). 
11 See id. at 359 (opposing regulator’s view about capital requirements on financial institutions, and 
arguing that financial institutions need more capital like debts to invest to increase profits or increase 
their stock’s value).                      
12 Id. at 347.    
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competitors. 13  The thrift industry is unlikely to be an exception to these 
disadvantages. 
 After the crisis, the U.S. government put more intensive regulations on the 
financial industry through the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the government should have 
acted more fairly when it placed the increased capital requirements on both the 
banking industry and the thrift industry. Although smaller financial institutions 
traditionally face more intensive capital requirements than larger financial institutions, 
there is no evidence that smaller institutions pose a greater failure risk than bigger 
ones. 14  More equitable regulations are needed that are based on the unique 
circumstance and character of each financial institution. The government should 
consider each unique characteristic first, and then decide how best to regulate thrifts.  
The thrift industry operates under completely different circumstances than the 
banking industry, such as the QTL test and scales of assets, so that if thrifts face 
similar regulations to banks, thrifts may be disadvantaged.15 Even prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act, the QTL test caused more than forty thrifts to go bankrupt between 2007 
and 2009.16 The new international capital standard under Basel III17 may lead thrifts 
13 Id. at 348.    
14 Id. at 347–8.   
15 See supra note 1, at 2.  
16 Id (stating that “While Congress relaxed regulations on thrifts in the 1980s to allow them to operate 
more like banks, especially at the community bank level, thrifts are still required to maintain at least 65 
percent of their assets in home mortgages and other forms of retail lending, in order to meet the 
qualified thrift lender test”; “not surprisingly given this asset concentration, over 40 thrifts failed during 
2007-2009, including the largest, Washington Mutual, with $300 billion in assets”).   
17 Basel III is defined as “a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking 
sector,” and “these measures aim to: improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from 
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to convert to bank charters due to the increased risk-based and leverage capital 
requirements.18 Thrift-holding companies may also suffer because of the Collins 
Amendment that treats thrift holding companies almost the same as bank holding 
companies.19 In this sense, more intensive capital requirements set by the Basel III 
may cause the thrift industry to disappear. 
B.  The Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL) Test 
The Qualified Thrift Lender test (QTL) was established to provide residential 
mortgage services to local residents through the thrift industry.20 Thus, the thrift 
industry was able to occupy a substantial part of the total mortgage market. 21 
However, the QTL test prevents thrifts from developing and causes thrifts to 
disappear.22 Given these reasons, it has been periodically argued whether thrifts are 
needed and whether the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) should be merged into the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).23  
The QTL test may also cause a thrift crisis whenever the housing market falls 
financial and economic stress, whatever the source; improve risk management and governance; 
strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.” International regulatory framework for banks (Basel 
III), BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm. 
18  Halah Touryalai, New Fed Rules Will Kill Thrift Banks, FORBES, June 11, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/11/new-fed-rules-will-kill-thrift-banks-kbw-says/. 
19 Supra note 1, at 6.  
20 KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY 
FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 175 (2011). To comply with the QTL test, thrifts must invest 65 percent of 
their total assets into residential mortgage lending business.  
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
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because thrifts must invest sixty-five percent of their total assets in predominately 
residential mortgage loans.24 This test does not seem appropriate anymore because 
although thrifts occupied more than two thirds of the mortgage lending business in the 
1960s, today they control less than twenty-five percent of the total mortgage lending 
business.25 This test is also responsible for causing several thrifts to become insolvent 
during the financial crisis of 2008.26  
The Dodd-Frank Act leaves the QTL test intact although the Act places 
additional intensive regulations on the thrift industry.27 Given that the thrift industry 
takes less than one fourth of total mortgage lending business, the QTL test should be 
changed in order for the thrift industry to survive.28 Under current circumstances, it is 
doubtful whether the test is still needed for the thrifts.  
C.  Changed Regulatory System 
1.  Changed Regulation of the Thrift Industry 
 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, more intensive and stringent rules and regulations 
24 See id. at 174.  
25 Supra note 1, at 2.  
26 Id.  
27 V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 5, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf; The U.S. government through the Dodd-
Frank Act provides the CFPB mortgage loan regulation as an effective change for thrifts by giving 
several exemptions and adjustments under which thrifts can lessen their burden complying with 
regulations. Despite of the effective change, the QTL test still seems to be huge burden for thrifts to 
comply with. See Summary of the Final Mortgage Servicing Rules 1, CONSUMER FINANCE PROTECTION 
BUREAU, Jan. 17, 2013, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201301_cfpb_servicing-rules_summary.pdf.  
28 See supra note 1, at 2.  
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will be created compared to the previous supervisions conducted by the OTS.29 It is 
expected that thrift examinations by the OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC will be more 
complex and strict because the OCC will treat small-size thrifts as community 
banks.30 The OCC also treats mid-size and large-size thrifts as commercial banks, 
and the FRB imposes the same level of regulation on thrift holding companies as they 
do on bank holding companies.31 Therefore, thrift industries will be subject to the 
same level of regulation as the banking industry.32 However, applying more stringent 
regulations equally to all financial institutions without considering each financial 
institution’s unique character and business model may create confusion in the 
financial market. Imposing stronger regulations like capital requirements on all 
financial institutions may not bring about optimal results.33  
 While more stringent regulations will be imposed on thrifts than before, there 
are also old regulations that thrifts are subject to, such as the QTL rule.34 The QTL 
rule makes thrifts more vulnerable to downturns in the housing market than 
29 Dwight C. Smith et al., Morrison & Foerster, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act: Future for Thrift Institutions (Mar. 2011) at 3, available at 
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110331-User-Guide-Thrift-Institutions.pdf (stating that 
“the basic examination and supervision goals remain unchanged, but the day-to-day functions will be 
different—and likely more intense.”). 
30 Supra note 1, at 2.  
31 Id. at 2, 8.   
32 Carol Beaumier et al., Protiviti, U.S. Regulatory Reform – Impact on the Thrift Industry, available at 
http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/POV/POV-US-Regulatory-Reform-Thrift.pdf (also stating, 
“thrifts will likely find that other federal bank regulators take a broader and more intensive and critical 
approach to regulatory examinations, particularly in areas outside of residential lending, such as 
commercial banking, fiduciary operations and investment activities”). 
33 Louis Massard, A Review of the New Financial Deal by David Skeel, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 435, 
436 (2012). 
34 Gerard, supra note 27. 
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commercial banks.35 Moreover, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts that fail the 
QTL test will now face harsh consequences, like the elimination of a grace period for 
compliance.36  
2.  Comparison between the Dodd-Frank Act & GAO’s Recommendations 
(a)  Consolidation of Regulatory Agencies 
 The Dodd-Frank Act does not include some elements suggested by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to achieve the most effective and efficient 
financial regulatory system.37 Although the Dodd-Frank Act tried to consolidate U.S. 
regulatory systems by removing the OTS and by merging OTS’s role and authority 
into existing and new federal regulatory agencies, a turf battle may nonetheless 
result.38 Unlike the pre-Dodd Frank era when the OTS was responsible for the 
supervision and examination of thrift industries, four regulatory agencies (the OCC, 
the FDIC, the FRB, and the BCFP) are now responsible for thrift regulation.39 The 
existence of multiple agencies that supervise and examine thrifts may lead to 
competition between the OCC and the FDIC in an attempt to maintain their respective 
regimes.  
35 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 32 (2009). 
36 Gerard, supra note 27 (stating, “the Dodd-Frank Act increased the consequences for failing the QTL 
test”). 
37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 
(2009). 
38 Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption, and the State Role 
in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 171, 174 (2011). 
39 Alexander H. Modell, IX. Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation, 
and the Board of Governors, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 562, 562–573 (2011). 
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 One of the GAO’s suggestions is the consolidation of regulators.40 In the 
U.S., it is still possible for financial institutions to choose either a federal charter or a 
state charter.41 This charter option causes “regulatory arbitrage, in which institutions 
take advantage of variations in how agencies implement regulatory responsibilities in 
order to be subject to less scrutiny.”42 The multiple regulatory agencies of the thrift 
industry seem to contradict the GAO’s finding, and even the purpose of the Dodd-
Frank Act (to consolidate regulatory systems). The federal and state charter option 
may result in very confusing circumstances in the thrift industry.  
(b)  Independence from Regulated Institution 
 As mentioned above, four federal regulatory agencies are now responsible for 
supervising and regulating the thrift industry. According to a study of OTS’s operating 
budget, the OTS in the past received assessment fees from its regulated institutions.43 
OTS’s budget mostly came from these assessments.44 The OCC’s operating budget 
also comes from its regulated institutions.45 Because both regulatory agencies’ budget 
is derived largely from their regulated institutions, the agencies may not be 
independent from the financial institutions they supervise. According to the GAO’s 
40 Supra note 37, at 55.  
41 Id (stating, “under the current U.S. system, financial institutions often have several options for how 
to operate their business and who will be their regulator”).   
42 Id.  
43  FRB, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 23, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/regreform/joint_implementation_20110125.pdf 
(2011). 
44 Id.  
45 Supra note 37, at 59.  
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recommendation, regulatory agencies should be independent from their regulated 
institutions so that the agencies can appropriately regulate and supervise institutions 
without considering assessments.46 
 However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not address the problem of independence. 
The Dodd-Frank Act still allows the OCC to receive assessments from its regulated 
institutions.47 In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act also lets the FRB and the FDIC 
receive assessments from regulated institutions unlike before.48 This new provision 
may impose a greater economic burden of having to pay examination fees to 
regulators.49 As long as regulatory agencies are not independent from their regulated 
institutions, the regulatory system remains untrustworthy. Regulatory agencies will 
continue to be dependent on the regulated institutions even after the Dodd-Frank Act.   
(c)  Differentiated Levels of Regulation for Different Financial 
Institutions based on Risk-Based Criteria 
 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, new regulatory agencies are responsible for 
supervising and examining the thrift industry.50 Because the OCC is responsible for 
federally chartered thrifts, thrifts may have trouble adjusting to the new regulator and 
complying with new regulations set by the OCC.51 As mentioned above, the OCC 
46 See id.   
47 Gerard, supra note 27, at 4.  
48 See id.  
49 Id.  
50 Supra note 3, at 114.  
51 Id. 
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will regulate thrifts based on size, so small thrifts will be regulated as community 
banks.52 Also, mid and large-size thrifts will be regulated as commercial banks by the 
OCC.53 However, commercial banks and thrifts, or community banks and thrifts have 
unique characteristics and business types; thus, problematic issues may arise. Because 
the OCC has been working for the commercial banking industry, it is expected that 
the OCC will treat thrifts as commercial banks in many regulatory aspects.54 Also, 
the OCC does not use OTS’s suggested method of regulating and supervising thrifts.55 
The FRB also treats savings and loan holding companies as bank holding companies 
for examination and supervision purposes under the Dodd-Frank Act.56  
 However, according to the GAO’s recommendation, “a regulatory system 
should ensure that similar institutions, products, and services posing similar risks are 
subject to consistent regulation, oversight, and transparency.”57 The recommendation 
also states that different regulation should be applied to financial institutions that pose 
different risks to the financial system, even though the financial institutions seem 
similar.58 If new regulatory agencies do not create differentiated regulations for the 
52 Supra note 1, at 2.  
53 Id.   
54 Chip MacDonal et al., After the OTS—Should Thrifts Convert to Commercial Banks? (Bloomberg 
Law Reports, Aug. 2011), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/5064ffd8-e6f6-44b1-b223-
e664f0ee47c6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c7adf431-6f84-4e1f-81a4-
ea980cc173d5/macdonald%20schwartz%20after%20the%20ots.pdf. 
55 Id.  
56 V. Gerard Comizio et al., Paul Hastings, Time for a Change – the Thrift Charter and Strategic 
Considerations for Conversion (Feb. 2011) at 2, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1839.pdf. 
57 Supra note 37, at 60.  
58 Id.  
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thrift industry, thrifts may face serious problems surviving. As suggested by the GAO, 
differentiated regulations are needed.   
(d)  Over the Counter (OTC) Derivatives 
The Dodd-Frank Act sets new regulations on Over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, which are very controversial and created significant debates among 
congressmen.59 The purpose of the regulation is to “promote greater transparency and 
to moderate systemic risks in order to minimize the recurrence of operational stresses 
and excessive risk taking perceived by Congress to have occurred through OTC 
derivatives activities, and which contributed to the 2007-09 financial crisis.” 60 
However, people who oppose the regulation argue that the swaps trading did not 
actually contribute to the financial crisis of 2008.61  
Regarding the OTC derivatives, the Act sets new requirements on the thrift 
industry. First, thrifts or thrift holding companies have to register either Swap Dealers 
(SD) or Major Swap Participants (MSP); second, the thrift industry must comply with 
the Push-Out Amendment, called the Lincoln Amendment.62 After registering as 
either SD or MSP, the thrift industry has to comply with more requirements.63 These 
59 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Clients & Friends Memo, The Lincoln Amendment: Banks, 
Swap Dealers, National Treatment and the Future of the Amendment 2 (Dec. 2010) (there was no 
contribution to the mortgage crisis by the swap trading business).  
60 PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on OTC Derivatives Activities 1 (Aug. 2010).  
61 Supra note 59.  
62 Supra note 1, at 8.  
63 Supra note 60, at 3 (stating that “Dodd-Frank mandates certain studies of capital adequacy and 
imposes capital requirements on swap dealers and MSPs in an effort to better understand and mitigate 
the systemic risk of derivatives markets”; “Swap dealers and MSPs will be subject to new minimum 
capital standards that are to be comparable to those applicable to banks, and with comparatively higher 
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requirements include, “reporting, recordkeeping, business conduct, collateral 
management, capital, liquidity, and margin standards.”64 
First, thrifts and thrift holding companies must register as SD or MSP through 
the CFTC or SEC, and acting as SD or MSP without registering is explicitly forbidden 
under the Act.65 However, the Act applies this requirement to all financial institutions 
without considering the unique condition and character of each one. In order to 
become SD or MSP, applicants have to comply with several requirements, such as 
capital requirements, margin requirements, and various duties.66 By doing so, the 
thrift industry faces increased regulatory burdens as it is forced to deal with additional 
regulatory agencies (CFTC and SEC) and regulations.67 The new regulatory system 
may increase compliance costs, and make it harder for thrifts or thrift holding 
companies to continue operating their businesses. On the regulators’ side, registration 
acts as a method of ensuring safe and sound swaps, but for thrifts or holding 
companies, the burden of compliance may seem excessive.68    
In addition to SD and MSP registrations, thrifts or holding companies are also 
required to comply with the push-out amendment, which prevents insured depository 
counterparty capital charges for non-cleared derivatives activities”).  
64 PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Dealers and Major Swap Participants 1 (Jan. 2011). 
65 Id. 
66 See id.   
67 See id. 
68 See supra note 60, at 3; PWC, A Closer Look, Implications of Derivatives Regulation and Changing 
Market Infrastructure for Nonfinancial Companies 2 (July 2011) (stating, “Companies with significant 
swap activities could face enhanced registration requirements and ongoing regulation”; “New 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements are intended to increase transparency for all participants and 
allow regulators to better monitor risks and potential market manipulation”). 
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institutions from acting as swap dealers and leads institutions to push out swap 
activities to nonfinancial affiliates.69 Complying with the amendment may result in 
negative outcomes because swaps dealers may not receive federal assistance, 
including Federal Reserve credit facility and FDIC insurance. 70  There are two 
alternatives that require thrifts or holding companies “to bifurcate their swaps desk 
between interest swaps and other bank eligible swaps, which may remain in the bank 
or branch, and all other swaps, which much be pushed to the holding company or 
another affiliate; or to push their entire swaps desks into holding company or 
affiliate.”71  
There are many reasons why the alternatives may adversely affect the thrift 
industry. 72  Pushing swaps activities into nonfinancial affiliates may make their 
customers uncomfortable because they have to deal with divided entities of a thrift 
holding company (either a holding company or its affiliate).73 This alternative also 
may take netting privileges away from their customers.74 Accordingly, customers 
may find a much smaller entity, which may be exempt from the requirement but less 
creditworthy, to deal with swaps activities.75 Thrift holding companies may have to 
69 Supra note 59 (Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act forbids financial institutions from becoming 
swap dealers for swap businesses). 
70 Id. at 3–4.  
71 Id. at 7–8.  
72 Id. at 8. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
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divide swaps activities into interest swaps and other thrift eligible swaps.76 This 
requirement not only costs more, but also places greater capital requirements on 
thrifts.77 In this sense, the legislation and compliance requirements may negatively 
affect thrifts and thrift holding companies. 
76 Id. at 7.  
77 Id. at 8 (stating, “(T)he former alternative would require the bank holding company to conduct all of 
its swaps desk activities outside the bank in an entity that typically carries a much higher internal cost 
of funds, and to maintain a large pool of capital – separate from the capital maintained at the bank – in 
order to support the pushed-out swap dealing activities”). 
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V.  HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT MAY NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 
 Since the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, the number of thrifts in 
operation has been steadily decreasing.1 The main purpose of thrifts is to accept 
deposits from local residents, make loans to local people, and promote a community’s 
housing market.2 However, as other financial institutions such as commercial banks 
and non-banking mortgage lenders get more involved in the mortgage lending 
business, thrifts may lose their unique standing in the mortgage lending industry.3 
Following the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act4 was enacted to 
promote a sound and secure financial system, and includes measures to protect 
financial consumers.5 However, the Act focuses more on preventing a future crisis, at 
the expense of caring less about the different characteristics of the market players in 
the financial industry. Thus, it is possible that the Dodd-Frank Act might kill the thrift 
industry by creating a too heavy regulatory burden.  
A.  How the Dodd-Frank Act Impacts Community Banks 
 After major crises, the conventional response of the U.S. legislature has been 
1 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, 2010 FACT BOOK: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 
5 (June 2011). 
2  Halah Touryalai, New Fed Rules Will Kill Thrift Banks, FORBES, June 11, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/11/new-fed-rules-will-kill-thrift-banks-kbw-says/. 
3 See id. (stating that following the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts would be disappear, and commercial banks 
and non-bank mortgage lenders would occupy the mortgage lending business instead).      
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
5 Tanya D. Marsh & Adjunct Scholar American Enterprise Institute, Regulatory Burdens: The Impact 
of Dodd Frank on Community Banking 1, 9 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
July 18, 2013). 
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to propose strong regulations in order to prevent future damages.6 The Dodd-Frank 
Act is no exception as it puts more emphasis on regulatory systems.7 Small-scaled 
financial institutions may find it difficult to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act.8 It has 
already been shown how the Act adversely affects smaller banks, especially 
community banks.9 It is important to analyze how community banks are negatively 
affected by the Act because community banks and thrifts share many similarities.10  
 It will be difficult for community banks to operate their businesses and 
comply with the Dodd-Frank Act because they will likely face greater compliance 
costs that will make it difficult to compete with larger banks.11 Under the Act, 
community banks will also be required to provide standardized products and forms.12 
Complying with the Act requires increased standardization, and therefore may hurt 
financial consumers, including low-income people, because they may not be eligible 
6 Id. at 4–5 (stating that “the American system of banking regulation is a system of regulation by 
accretion – it is the result of legislative responses to particular crises, from the need to create a market 
for U.S. national bonds to help finance the Civil War, which led to the creation of national bank 
charters, the creation of the Federal Reserve after the monetary panic of 1907, the creation of the FDIC 
following the stock market crash of 1929, and Dodd-Frank after the 2007 financial crisis,” and “each of 
these legislative efforts was a well-meaning attempt to deal with the perceived problems that led to 
each crisis”). 
7 See Christopher Brown, “Community Banks: Paper Delivered at Fed Conference Argues For Two-
Tiered Bank Regulatory System,” 101 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 556 (Oct. 4, 2013). 
8 Louise Bennetts, Thanks to Dodd-Frank, Community Banks Are Too Small to Survive, AMERICAN 
BANKER, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/thanks-to-dodd-frank-community-
banks-too-small-too-survive-1054241-1.html. 
9 Supra note 5, at 2 (regulatory burdens on community banks following the Dodd-Frank Act will 
ultimatley cause not only a demise of the community banking industry, but also a boom for huge banks 
only; low-income or unbanked people will struggle to access financial services. The Act will eventually 
lead to worse situations for both financial consumers and the U.S. economy).  
10 For more information about similarities between thrifts and community banks, see infra pp. 66–67. 
11 Supra note 7. 
12 Id.  
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to borrow money from community banks due to their credit status.13 Smaller banks 
have a much simpler and more limited business model and scale than bigger banks do, 
and, therefore, they have unique strategies to serve financial products that bigger 
banks do not.14 However, under the Dodd-Frank Act, smaller banks would be unable 
to provide such services and would lose their unique advantages over bigger banks.15 
In this sense, the Dodd-Frank Act would give rise to several problems by putting a lot 
of pressure on community banks, and by preventing low-income people from having 
access to financial services.  
Community banks, consumers, and even the economy will suffer by 
complying with the Dodd-Frank Act because community banks will lose their 
consumers due to more standardized products, and consumers will look for other 
financial institutions to borrow money, and will face higher interest fees.16 This may 
lead to a worsening of the economy where community banks become insolvent, and 
consumers have increased debt obligations. Even though there is no doubt that the 
Dodd-Frank Act is needed for fostering a sound and safe financial system, protecting 
financial consumers, and preventing the “too big to fail” mentality, the Act comes 
13 Id.  
14 Id (stating, “the push to standardize the banking industry thus threatens access to credit for 
underserved communities, and threatens the competitive position of community banks, which thrive in 
part because they offer something that the larger banks cannot: flexibility based on local knowledge”). 
15 Supra note 5. 
16  Dodd-Frankenstein: Small Bank Slayer, INVESTORS. COM, Mar. 21, 2013, 
http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/032113-648962-fdic-says-dodd-frank-hurting-small-banks.htm 
(stating that “the authors of Dodd-Frank were concerned with the problems caused by the under-
regulation of financial services firms, but we should be as concerned with the damage to community 
banks, the American economy, and the American consumer through over-regulation.”). See supra note 
7. 
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across as over-regulation. 17  Smaller banks, including community banks, have 
relatively smaller systemic risks than larger banks, but both will face similar levels of 
regulation.18 If so, smaller banks may not be able to afford compliance with the over-
regulation.19   
 The Dodd-Frank Act is too complex to be understood by community banks’ 
regular employees, so banks will need to hire experts to guide them through the 
compliance process.20 During this process, community banks will incur compliance 
costs.21 There are also complicated regulatory systems based on the dual banking 
system of federal and state regulators and regulations.22 These complex systems 
create even more compliance costs for the community banking industry.23  
B.  Several Similarities between Thrifts and Community Banks 
 Although community banks and thrifts are different kinds of financial 
17 Supra note 5, at 5. 
18 Jeff Bater, Community Banks: Fed’s Powell Announces Plans to Update supervision Program for 
Community Banks, BLOOMBERG BNA, Oct. 4, 2013, http://bl-law-
komodo.ads.iu.edu:2213/bdln/BDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=37018164&vname=bbdbulallissues
&wsn=496889000&searchid=21413312&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=BDLN
WB&pg=0 (mentioning that community banks will receive almost the same level of regulation that has 
applied to commercial banks). 
19 Supra note 7. 
20 Id (stating that one third of the Dodd-Frank Act was needed to be effective, and the Act spans more 
than 600 pages); Tanya D. Marsh & Joseph W. Norman, Reforming The Regulation of Community 
Banks After Dodd-Frank 2 (Working Paper Series, Oct. 1, 2013) (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act is 
incredibly complex and hard to understand, comprising of “16 titles over 838 pages”). 
21 See Christopher (stating that small banks have to shoulder more compliance costs than big banks 
after new regulations were introduced, including “learning the requirements of a regulation, reviewing 
and redesigning credit applications, changing data-processing systems, and revising credit-evaluation 
models”). 
22 Id. (stating that the U.S. regulatory system is complex and the “system is characterized by a variety 
of state and federal regulators, a high volume of regulations, and a complex system of supervision and 
examination that results in significant compliance costs, and the system is too complex and too costly 
for community banks”). 
23 Id.               
66 
 
                                           
institutions, they share many characteristics in common. First, both financial 
institutions are minority depository institutions with fewer assets than commercial 
banking institutions.24 Their roles are very significant for communities even though 
they are minority institutions.25 Next, both community banks and thrifts have much 
smaller and more limited business models than big banks do, which serve various 
kinds of financial services without limitations on geographic diversification.26 Also, 
community banks and thrifts provide financial services that big banks do not.27 To be 
successful, smaller banks need to be friendly in working with their local community.28 
Last, they usually do not have experts and lawyers to assist with regulatory 
compliance.29  
 
C.  Hypothetical Cases: How Thrifts Are Affected by the Dodd-Frank Act 
 After analyzing how the Dodd-Frank Act adversely affects community banks, 
it may be possible to predict what will happen to the thrift industry under the Act. 
When the mortgage crisis happened, larger thrifts, including the biggest thrifts in the 
nation, went insolvent.30 Washington Mutual Bank, Indy Mac, Golden West Financial, 
24 Curry to NAB: We Want Community Banks and Thrifts to be Able to Thrive, BANKNEWS, Oct. 4, 
2012, available at http://www.banknews.com/Single-News-
Page.51.0.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=8&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=17033&tx
_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=995&cHash=1fd8553ec9. 
25 Id.         
26 Id.         
27 Id.           
28 Id.            
29 Id.            
30 KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 176–182 (2011).   
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and Downey Savings & Loan were among the insolvent thrifts during the crisis.31 
There were several reasons why they became insolvent, including inappropriate 
regulations by the Office of Thrift Supervision, impractical businesses, and subprime 
mortgage lending.32  
 Larger thrifts contributed to the mortgage crisis of 2008, so it is appropriate 
for the government to regulate and supervise the thrift industry more strictly.33 
However, thrifts have been operating their businesses successfully since the crisis. 
There are several reasons why regulatory agencies should supervise and regulate 
larger commercial banks and thrifts differently. The commercial banking industry has 
much greater assets, liabilities, and capital ten times more than thrifts. 34  The 
commercial banking industry has more diverse business models than thrifts as well.35 
Based on these facts, the entire banking industry poses much bigger systemic risks 
than thrifts. In short, similar level of regulation on banks and thrifts is not reasonable. 
 Several thrifts became insolvent since 2010, including La Jolla Bank, FSB, 
Lydian Private Bank, and First Federal Bank. Each of the institutions demonstrates 
31 Id.   
32 See id. at 183–84 (stating that the formal director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Reich, was in 
favor of deregulating the thrift industry and allowed thrifts industry to go with the pay-option ARM).  
33 Id. at 176 (stating that thrifts were significantly engaged in subprime mortgage lending and other 
risky activities under the support of the director of the OTS and these activities resulted in catastrophe. 
Also, it is no exaggeration to say that the mortgage crisis of 2009 was largely caused by thrifts because 
“of the seven biggest depository institution failures in 2007 and 2008, five of them were thrifts 
supervised by OTS”). 
34 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, available 
at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main4.asp (as of June 30, 2013, all national commercial banks’ total 
assets, liabilities, and equity capital are over ten times greater than all national savings institutions’ 
according to the figures on the Statistics on Depository Institutions Reports of FDIC) (last visited Nov. 
10, 2013). 
35 See id.   
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how the Dodd-Frank Act may adversely affect the thrift industry. First, La Jolla Bank, 
FSB (La Jolla) had $3,751,254 in total assets and began to have problems after late 
2008.36 La Jolla’s net income had decreased since late 2008.37 La Jolla was declared 
an insolvent financial institution in early 2010.38 According to La Jolla’s income 
statement, it had a positive net income of $15,540 in September 2008.39 However, in 
late 2008, La Jolla recorded a negative net income of $9,710, and in September 2009, 
it recorded a more serious negative net income of $13,166.40 Finally, in late 2009, La 
Jolla recorded its worst negative net income: $289,598.41 According to La Jolla’s 
balance sheet, mortgage loans were the main financial services of La Jolla and most 
of its earnings came from mortgages.42 In September 2008, La Jolla earned interest 
income of $55,499 from mortgage loans.43 But in September and December of 2009, 
36 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (Sept. 30, 
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/09302008/tfr/tfrsc.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 
2013); FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 
30, 2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/09302009/tfr/tfrso.asp (last visited Nov. 
10, 2013). 
37 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 30, 
2009).   
38 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FAILED BANKS ON INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lajolla.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
39 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (Sept. 30, 
2008), supra note 36.  
40 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312008/tfr/tfrso.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 
2013); FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 
30, 2009), supra note 36. 
41 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 
2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312009/tfr/tfrso.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 
2013). 
42 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (Sept. 30, 
2008), supra note 36.  
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it earned less interest income from mortgage loans, decreasing from $46,398 to 
$38,239.44 Because La Jolla lost its main source of income (mortgage loans) there 
were no viable alternatives to earn interest based on its interest income statement.45 
Eventually, La Jolla could no longer operate its business.46  
Under these circumstances, La Jolla probably found it impossible to comply 
with the Dodd-Frank Act. Even if La Jolla survived, La Jolla probably would have 
faced at least two problems. The first problem is that it would not have been able to 
afford to spend compliance costs to hire Dodd-Frank Act experts and lawyers. Also, 
increased capital requirements would have prevented La Jolla from expanding its 
business because increased capital requirements limit what financial institutions can 
do. By setting a high capital standard, the government prevents thrifts from 
undertaking risky activities, which may result in an unfavorable business environment 
where thrifts fail to increase profits. Eventually, this may lead thrifts to become 
insolvent.  
In addition to the compliance costs and increased capital standards, La Jolla 
would have been limited in making loans to its consumers because the Dodd-Frank 
Act requires high standardization. With high standardization, La Jolla would have 
been allowed to make loans only to consumers with good credit. Of course, La Jolla 
on its own would not have caused another subprime mortgage crisis, and small banks 
43 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 30, 
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/09302008/tfr/tfrso.asp. 
44 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 30, 
2009), supra note 36; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL 
REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 2009), supra note 41.   
45 See id.                
46 Supra note 38.  
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in local communities need to have a somewhat weaker standardization in order to 
make loans. This is because small banks and thrifts usually deal with average people 
or unbanked people. If there was no flexibility in standardization, La Jolla would have 
faced much greater deficits by complying with the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, La Jolla would have the burden of not only 
increased capital requirements, high standardization, and compliance costs, but also 
the stricter QTL test.47 Complying with the Dodd-Frank Act would have been too 
much for La Jolla to continue operating its business. When La Jolla’s main income 
source from the mortgage lending business decreased, it could not invest more in 
other kinds of businesses due to the QTL test and the higher capital requirements. On 
the other hand, if La Jolla were not obligated by law to invest a certain percentage in 
residential mortgages, it would have found other ways to make a profit. In addition, 
La Jolla was exposed to the instability created by the bad housing market. Therefore, 
there was a high possibility that La Jolla, even if it survived, would have faced 
difficulties in complying with the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Another insolvent thrift was Lydian Private Bank (Lydian). Lydian had 
$2,116,737 in assets, and its main business was mortgage loans as of the end of 
2008.48 Lydian had big problems since 2010 when it recorded a negative net income 
47 Morrison & Foerster, Thrift Institutions after Dodd-Frank: The New Regulatory Framework 3 (Dec. 
2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/111208-Thrift-Institutions-User-
Guide.pdf (stating that “Dodd-Frank imposes new sanctions for the failure by a savings association to 
comply with the qualified thrift lender test,” and “the principle change is that the one-year grace period 
to return to compliance is eliminated”); The QTL test makes thrifts focus more on providing mortgage 
loans and other household loans, it has been argued that “the QTL rule made thrifts highly exposed to 
residential mortgages, placing them at heightened risk.” See supra note 30.  
48 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (Dec. 31, 
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312008/tfr/tfrsc.asp.  
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of $47,154.49 In December 2008, Lydian had $20,100 of interest income from the 
mortgage loans, but in December of 2009, its interest income decreased to $14,386.50 
One year later, Lydian recorded a $10,305 interest income with a large negative net 
income of $47,154.51 With another negative income of $23,356 in March 2011, 
Lydian eventually became insolvent in August 2011.52 
 The Dodd-Frank Act may have negatively affected Lydian’s business for the 
following reasons. First, according to Lydian’s balance sheet and income statement, 
its interest income from mortgage loans decreased. Lydian also relied heavily on 
mortgage lending, and (assuming that Lydian had problems with mortgage lending) it 
probably had no other alternatives. Because the Dodd-Frank Act required increased 
capital from Lydian, Lydian could not expand its business. Lydian would have also 
struggled with its lending business because of the increased standardization provision 
in the Dodd-Frank Act. Larger commercial banks have different tiers of financial 
consumers, from average people to big businessmen, so they suffer less from 
standardization. However, thrifts have their unique financial consumers, who are 
primarily local people with average or low-incomes. Under the standardization, thrifts 
may lose their target consumers because the consumers may no longer be eligible to 
49 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 
2010), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312010/tfr/tfrso.asp. 
50 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312008/tfr/tfrso.asp; FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312009/tfr/tfrso.asp. 
51 Supra note 49. 
52 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FAILED BANKS ON INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lydian.html; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Mar. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/03312011/tfr/tfrso.asp. 
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borrow money from them. Moreover, because Lydian had to comply with the QTL 
test, it could not invest in other alternatives to make profits. Thrifts also seem to be 
very vulnerable to unfavorable circumstances whenever the economy or housing 
market deteriorates. Furthermore, Lydian had the burden of spending compliance 
costs to conform to the Dodd-Frank Act, by incurring hiring fees for experts or 
lawyers. 
 With the above situations resulting from stricter regulations of the Dodd-
Frank Act, Lydian could not avoid insolvency. The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is 
to promote sound and safe financial systems and to protect financial consumers, but 
ironically it may cause unsafe financial systems by imposing heavy regulations 
without considering the different sizes and conditions of the regulated institutions. 
The Act may even cause more insolvency of thrifts and threaten the stability of the 
financial system. It must also be noted that financial consumers with average or low 
incomes and unbanked individuals could suffer limited access to financial services if 
thrifts can no longer operate under the Dodd-Frank Act. Commercial banks sometimes 
are unwilling to provide financial services for this group because the bank can still 
make profits without loaning to these individuals. Therefore, the thrift industry needs 
suitable regulations based on its size and unique business character in order to thrive 
in the U.S. financial world.  
 The last illustration is First Federal Bank (FFB). FFB had $140,802 in total 
assets, and its main business was also mortgage lending as of June 30, 2009.53 
According to FFB’s balance sheet and income statement, FFB had no profit 
53 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (June 30, 
2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/06302009/tfr/tfrsc.asp. 
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alternatives without mortgage lending.54 Without alternatives, it was probably very 
difficult to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. In June 2009, FFB recorded deficits of 
$176.55 A year later, it recorded worse deficits of $1,861, and in June 2012, FFB 
made a serious negative record of $3,623.56 These deficits were probably the main 
cause of FFB’s insolvency in April of 2013.57 
 FFB was quite a small thrift with $108,889 in total assets, and it is unlikely 
that FFB could afford compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act.58 Under the Act, FFB 
had to spend compliance costs to understand the Act by hiring legal experts. As FFB 
had only twenty-eight employees, they probably had to retain advisors, but hiring 
them was hard due to the cost.59 In addition to the compliance cost, the Dodd-Frank 
Act increased capital rules and standardization for lending, which might have 
prevented FBB from making a profit. It has unique customers, so the standardization 
prevented its customers from having access to financial services provided by FBB. 
Also, it is likely that the increased capital rules and the QTL test thwarted FBB’s 
54 See id; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO 
(June 30, 2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/06302009/tfr/tfrso.asp. 
55 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (June 30, 
2009). 
56 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (June 30, 
2010), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/06302010/tfr/tfrso.asp; FEDERAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A 
BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY – FIEC 041 (Jan. 28, 2013), 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/Public/ViewPDFFacsimile.aspx.  
57 Institution Failures, IBANKNET, http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/filist.aspx?type=failures 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
58 See id.       
59 Institution Failures, First Federal Bank, IBANKNET, 
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/getbank.aspx?ibnid=usa_578675 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2013). 
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business because FBB was limited to conducting mortgage lending. When the 
condition of the economy or housing market is bad, FBB, a small-scale thrift, could 
not survive under the Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
D.  Conclusion 
 The Dodd-Frank Act may exacerbate the business operating conditions for 
thrifts for several reasons: thrifts do not receive differentiated regulations under the 
Dodd-Frank Act and face the same regulations as large commercial banks. Even 
though the sizes and business models are clearly different between commercial banks 
and thrifts, thrifts may be treated as commercial banks by regulatory agencies 
according to the Dodd-Frank Act. Thus, it may be very hard for the thrift industry to 
comply with regulations in the Act, including the increased capital requirement, 
increased standardization, onerous compliance costs, and the stricter QTL test. With 
the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts may find it hard to set the right direction of operating their 
businesses because they have no alternatives other than to engage in mortgage lending.  
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VI.  ANALYSIS OF THE S&L CRISIS, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, AND THE KOREAN 
SAVINGS BANK CRISIS 
A.  Overview 
The S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis of 2008 interestingly share similar 
causes and solutions.1 Factors like deregulation, fluctuant interest rates, risky lending, 
moral hazard, and inappropriate regulations, all contributed to the crises. 2 The 
solutions were also similar in that the government removed regulatory agencies 
responsible for the supervision of thrifts, the FHLBB and the OTS, after the S&L 
crisis and after the mortgage crisis of 2008 respectively as a way of strengthening the 
regulatory systems.3 Analyzing the thrift industry before and after the S&L crisis and 
the mortgage crisis of 2008 would be valuable for the U.S. government to prevent 
another thrift crisis.  
The Korean savings bank crisis shares many aspects in common with the 
S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis that the U.S. has experienced.4 Korean savings 
banks and U.S. savings associations are less specialized businesses compared to 
commercial banks, and the savings institutions in both countries were engaged in 
risky lending business—one of the biggest reasons for the crises.5 Project Financing 
1 Diane Scott Docking, DÉJÀ VU? A Comparison of the 1980s and 2008 Financial Crises, J. OF BUS., 
ECON. & FINANCE 17, 18 (2012).  
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Choi, Young-joo, The Influence of Large Shareholder in Savings Bank Insolvency and Regulation, 53 
PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 193, 196 (2012). 
5 Id. at 200–202.  
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(PF) conducted by savings banks was the main causes of the Korean crisis, and the 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) offered by large thrifts such as Country Wide, 
WAMU, and Indy Mac was also one of the significant contributing factors to the 
mortgage crisis of 2008.6 Studying the common factors between the crises would be 
very useful for preventing future crises not only in Korea and the U.S., but also for 
other financial markets in the world.  
B.  The U.S. S&L Crisis 
The U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis happened in the late 1980s, and was one of 
the biggest financial crises in the U.S.7 The crisis resulted from multiple causes such 
as weak regulation, moral hazard, and a tough economic atmosphere, all of which 
ruined the thrift industry.8 More than 560 thrifts failed, and more than 1,000 thrifts 
were acquired by either voluntary or supervisory mergers.9 In response to the crisis, 
the U.S. government eventually spent more than $160 billion to settle the crisis.10 
After the crisis, the U.S. government enacted two new statutes, the Financial 
Institutions Reforms, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which 
6 KIM, YOUNG-PHIL, WHY DID SAVINGS BANKS GO BANKRUPT? 130 (2012); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT 
STEPS 176–182 (2011). 
7 LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S & L DEBACLE 3 (1991). 
8  NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, 
ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATE 6–10 (1993). 
9 1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 169 (1997).  
10 Id.  
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abolished then-existing regulatory systems in order to promote a secure banking 
environment.11 
1.  The Thrift Industry Before the U.S. S&L Crisis 
Before the occurrence of the S&L crisis, the thrift industry had enjoyed 
multiple favorable regulations.12 Because of thrift-friendly regulations, thrifts were 
able to participate in high-risk business activities.13 There were reasons why the U.S. 
government gave such favorable treatment to the thrift industry.14 In the late 1970s, 
thrifts faced serious difficulties due to the disintermediation following the double 
figures market interest rates.15 To help the troubled thrifts, the government provided 
lax regulations as a break to thrifts.16 
(a)  The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980  
The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
11 Id. at 187–188.  
12 See infra pp.78–88 for more information on the favorable legislations. 
13 The U. S. government eliminated the limitation of loan to values ratios resulting in much riskier 
situation because the higher the ratio is, the higher risk lenders have. Also, the limits of interest rate for 
deposits were eliminated, and opportunities for new and expanded activities were made available by 
the government. See, supra note 9, at 176.   
14 Docking, supra note 1, 18.  
15 The disintermediation happened in the late 1970s in the U.S. because the commercial banking 
industry provided “money market mutual funds” to financial consumers. Since the funds yielded much 
higher rates than savings institutions did, financial consumers preferred using the funds to the savings 
institutions. See id. 
16 Id. The U.S. government enacted two legislations, the Depository Institution Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, to allow 
the thrift industry to overcome their difficulties. Through the legislations, the government eliminated 
several obstacles for thrifts by eliminating the limits of interest rates for deposits on thrifts, by 
increasing insurance coverage for deposits, and by providing circumstances that allowed to make 
various types of loan. 
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(DIDMCA) was enacted “to facilitate the implementation of monetary policy, to 
provide for the gradual elimination of all limitations on the rates of interest which are 
payable on deposits and accounts, and to authorize interest-bearing transaction 
accounts, and for other purposes.”17 DIDMCA helped thrifts increase loans and 
investments up to 20% of their assets, and further raise liquidity and earnings of thrift 
institutions.18 The Act also allowed thrifts to provide various services such as 
“Negotiable order of Withdrawal checking accounts (NOW),19 trust services,20 and 
credit cards,21” that thrifts previously could not offer.22  
Thrifts benefitted greatly from Section 303 of DIDMCA, under which they 
were permitted to offer NOW accounts to their customers.23 Furthermore, Section 
303 limited withdrawals by deposit or account owners for third party transfers, 
thereby protecting thrifts from large and frequent withdrawals by deposit or account 
17 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 
132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
18 Robert J. Laughlin, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 305 (1991); 
§ 401(2), 94 Stat. at 153:  
“LOANS OR INVESTMENTS LIMITED TO 20 PER CENTUM OF ASSETS.—The following loans 
or investments are permitted, but authority conferred in the following subparagraphs is limited to not in 
excess of 20 per centum of the assets of the association for each subparagraph: 
"(A) COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS.—Loans on security of first liens upon other improved 
real estate. 
"(B) CONSUMER LOANS AND CERTAIN SECURITIES.—An association may make secured or 
unsecured loans for personal, family, or household purposes, and may invest in, sell, or hold 
commercial paper and corporate debt securities, as defined and approved by the Board.” 
19 Id. § 303, 94 Stat. at 146. 
20 Id. § 403, 94 Stat. at 156. 
21 Id. § 402, 94 Stat. at 155. 
22 Robert, supra note 18, at 306.  
23 § 303, 94 Stat. at 146. 
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owners. 24  Under this section, individual or organization account–holders could 
withdraw their deposits for transfer purposes only if they were non-profit in nature.25  
Section 402 allowed thrifts to start issuing credit cards and participating in 
credit card businesses.26 This section also allowed thrifts to take part in credit card 
operations.27 Section 403 permitted thrifts to participate in trust activities as long as 
thrifts complied with state and local law.28 This Act allowed thrifts to engage in 
various businesses so that thrifts could compete with other depository institutions. 
Section 403(n)(1) provided that thrifts could engage in trust activities in 
accordance with state or local law.29 Under Section 403(n)(1), service corporations 
were permitted to invest in state-chartered or federally-chartered corporations that 
were located in the same state where the headquarters of the association was 
located.30 Section 403(n)(2) stated that thrifts, which were permitted to have trust 
powers, should operate in compliance with state or local law.31 If thrifts were not in 
compliance, they were not able to participate in trust activities.32 Section 403(n)(3) 
required thrifts to keep separate books and records for trust assets and those for 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. § 402, 94 Stat. at 155. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. § 403, 94 Stat. at 156. 
29 Id. § 403(n)(1). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. § 403(n)(2). 
32 Id.  
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general assets.33 Regarding books and records, state banking authorities were subject 
to examination. 34  Section 403(n)(4) prohibited associations from taking “trust 
department deposits of current funds” that were “subject to check or the deposit of 
checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other items for collection or exchange 
purposes.”35 If an association failed, Section 403(n)(5) required the association to 
provide the owners of funds that are held in trust for investment “a lien on the bond or 
other securities” that was set apart and on top of their rights to claim against the 
association’s estate.36                
DIDMCA phased out regulation Q, which had limited the maximum interest 
rates that thrifts could provide.37 The drafters of Section 202(a)(1) of title II of the 
Act were concerned that limiting interest rates prevented depositors from depositing 
their money.38 They also believed that such limitations kept thrifts from competing 
with other financial institutions for funds, and reduced home mortgage markets by 
cutting the distribution of funds, which was opposite to the purpose of thrifts.39 
Section 202(a)(2) acknowledged that depositors deserved to receive market interest 
rates on their savings accounts in thrifts that were able to generate and pay the 
33 Id. § 403(n)(3). 
34 Id.  
35 Id. § 403(n)(4). 
36 Id. § 403(n)(5). 
37 Thrifts faced obstacles from external factors, including the case of disintermediation, but the 
government provided several ways that thrifts could overcome the difficulties with new legislation. 
Docking, supra note 1.  
38 § 202(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 142. 
39 Id. 
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interest.40  
Under Section 202(b), Congress declared that the purpose of title II, 
Depository Institutions Deregulation, is “to provide for the orderly phase-out and the 
ultimate elimination of the limitations on the maximum rates of interest and dividends 
which may be paid on deposits and accounts by depository institutions by extending 
the authority to impose such limitations for 6-year, subject to specific standards 
designed to ensure a phase-out of such limitations to market rates of interest.”41 As 
its title clearly states, this Act was a breakthrough for thrifts, and resolved the 
disintermediation issue by repealing Regulation Q.42 Through the Act, the U.S. 
government tried to assist the struggling thrift industry.43  
Section 308(a)(1) of the Act increased the insurance limit coverage from 
$40,000 to $100,000 on the Financial Deposit Insurance Act.44 Section 308(a)(2) was 
an exception to this increased insurance coverage, and excluded failed financial 
institutions that had been closed before this section became effective.45 
In summary, DIDMCA attempted to make thrifts competitive with other 
financial institutions by allowing them to enter new fields of business, by letting them 
comply with lenient regulations, and by providing them higher insurance coverage. 
40 Id. § 202(a)(2). 
41 Id. § 202(b). 
42 Docking, supra note 1. 
43 Id. 
44 § 308(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 147. 
45 Id. § 308(a)(2). 
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Through DIDMCA the U.S. government tried to ensure the survival of thrifts after the 
hardships they had faced.    
(b)  The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 
The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St Germain) 
was enacted to “revitalize the housing industry by strengthening the financial stability 
of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring the availability of home mortgage 
loans.”46 Like DIDMCA, this Act also helped thrifts overcome the difficulties they 
were facing. 47 The drafters intended to provide stable financial institutions for 
mortgage loans and invigorative the housing market.48 Through the Garn-St Germain, 
Congress hoped the thrift industry would enter new, diverse fields of business.49 The 
Act also allowed thrifts to compete with money market mutual funds.50 The FHLBB 
was authorized to assist thrifts, which had financial problems following the Act.51 A 
program was established by the Act to financially assist troubled thrifts.52 Last, the 
Act let thrifts keep same the interest rates as commercial banks.53   
Regarding the new fields of business, Section 322 of the Garn-St Germain 
46 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
47 Supra note 9, at 175. 
48 Robert, supra note 18, at 314. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
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authorized thrifts to make real estate loans for up to 40% of their assets.54 Section 
323 of the Act authorized thrifts to invest in time deposits or other accounts of any 
bank, under the FDIC or the FSLIC.55 Section 324 of the Act gave thrifts the power 
to invest in government securities.56 Section 325 of the Act authorized thrifts to 
invest in commercial and other loans, such as corporate, business, and agricultural, up 
to 5% of total assets before the first day of 1984 or 10% of total assets after the first 
day of 1984.57 Thrifts were able to make commercial loans up to 30% of all assets 
pursuant to Section 329 of the Act.58 Section 330 permitted thrifts to invest in 
“tangible personal property, including, without limitation, vehicles, manufactured 
homes, machinery, equipment, or furniture, for rental or sale, but such investment 
may not exceed 10 per centum of the assets of the association.”59 Thrifts were also 
able to make loans for educational purposes.60 Lastly, the section allowed thrifts to 
invest in foreign assistance investments and small business investment companies.61   
54 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, § 322, 96 Stat. 1499 (1982) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
55 Id. § 323, 96 Stat. at 1499, 1500.  
56 Id. § 324, 96 Stat. at 1500.  
57 Id. § 325. 
58 Id. § 329, 96 Stat. at 1502.  
59 Id. § 330.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. “FOREIGN ASSISTANCE INVESTMENTS.—Investments in housing project loans having the 
benefit of any guaranty under section 221 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or loans having the 
benefit of any guarantee under section 224of such Act, or any commitment or agreement with respect 
to such loans made pursuant to either of such sections and in the share capital and capital reserve of the 
Inter-American Savings and Loan Bank. This authority extends to the acquisition, holding and 
disposition of loans having the benefit of any guaranty under section 221 or 222 of such Act as 
hereafter amended or extended, or of any commitment or agreement for any such guaranty. 
Investments under this subparagraph shall not exceed, in the case of any association,1 per centum of 
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In order to make it possible for thrifts to compete with other financial 
institutions, such as money market mutual funds, Section 327 of the Garn-St Germain 
created a money market deposit account.62 There was no limitation on the deposit 
accounts with respect to maximum rates or interest rates, so that thrifts could compete 
with the MMMF.63 In addition, the account was not treated the same as transaction 
accounts.64 As a result, the money market deposit account enabled thrifts to be 
competitive with other institutions.     
Section 123 of the Garn-St. Germain stated that when a financial institution 
met significant hardships that were capable of causing unstable and unsafe financial 
markets, the troubled institution may be entitled to receive financial assistance from 
other healthy financial institutions or companies.65 It stated that troubled financial 
institutions “are eligible for assistance pursuant to section 406(f) of this Act to merge 
or consolidate with, or to transfer its assets and liabilities to, any other insured 
institution or any insured bank, may authorize any other insured institution to acquire 
control of said insured institution, or may authorize any company to acquire control of 
said insured institution or to acquire the assets or assume the liabilities thereof.”66 
the assets of such association.” “SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES.—An association 
may invest in stock, obligations, or other securities of any small business investment company formed 
pursuant to section 301(d) of the Small Business Investment Act of1958, for the purpose of aiding 
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, but no association may make any investment under 
this subparagraph if its aggregate outstanding investment under this subparagraph would exceed 1 per 
centum of the assets of such association." 
62 Id. § 327, 96 Stat. at 1501.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. § 123, 96 Stat. at 1483.  
66 Id. § 123 (m)(1)(A)(i). 
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Prior to receiving assistance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was required 
to consult with state officials.67 Even if the state officials had a good reason to oppose 
the assistance, the Corporation could still decide to provide assistance to the failed 
thrifts by a unanimous vote by the management of the Corporation.68 Regarding the 
assistance, a healthy thrift in the same state was considered first in determining what 
institution the troubled thrifts should merge with.69 The Corporation gave priority not 
only to adjacent healthy financial institutions, but also to institutions of the same 
corporate governance, such as minority control, as the insolvent thrifts had.70 The 
FHLBB was newly responsible for managing the acquisitions of troubled institutions 
following the Act.71  
Section 122 of this Act was drafted to provide assistance to thrift institutions, 
and financial support to troubled institutions.72 The Corporation was permitted to 
financially support thrifts if the support was to prevent thrifts from being in default, to 
help thrifts return to a healthy status, to maintain the stability of important thrifts, or 
to reduce risk for the Corporation.73 The Corporation also had the power to stipulate 
67 Id. § 123 (B)(i).  
68 Id. § 123 (B)(iii). 
69 Id. § 123(m)(3)(B), 96 Stat. at 1484. “(i) First, between depository institutions of the same type 
within the same State; (ii) Second, between depository institutions of the same type in different States; 
(iii) Third, between depository institutions of different types in the same State; and (iv) Fourth, 
between depository institutions of different types in different States.”  
70 Id. § 123(m)(3)(C).  
71 Robert, supra note 18. 
72 § 122, 96 Stat. at 1480.  
73 Id. § 122 (f)(1). 
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rules when thrifts were considered to be in default.74 Whenever such thrifts seemed 
to be in default or to be negatively influencing other thrifts, the Corporation was able 
to stipulate the rules. 75  The Corporation was permitted to provide support for 
troubled thrifts to the extent necessary “to save the cost of liquidating,” but this 
limitation did not apply to cases where the Corporation believed that the thrifts were 
necessary for the purpose of providing community financial services. 76  The 
Corporation did not have the authority to manage certain stocks, such as “voting or 
common stock.”77 
When federal thrifts were in default, the Corporation could act as the 
conservator or receiver in order to maintain a stable and secure financial market.78 
For state thrifts, however, the FHLBB was authorized to appoint the Corporation as a 
conservator or receiver for state thrifts in default.79  
Section 326 of the Act removed different interest rates between commercial 
74 Id. § 122 (f)(2)(A), 96 Stat. at 1480, 1481. “(i) [T]o purchase any such assets or assume any such 
liabilities; (ii) to make loans or contributions to, or deposits in, or purchase the securities of, such other 
insured institution (which, for the purposes of this subparagraph, shall include a Federal savings bank 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); (iii) to guarantee such other insured institution 
(which, for the purposes of this subparagraph, shall include a Federal savings bank insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) against loss by reason of such other insured institution’s 
merging or consolidating with or assuming the liabilities and purchasing the assets of such insured 
institution; or (iv) to take any combination of the actions referred to in clauses (i) through (iii).”  
75 Id. §122 (f)(2)(B)(iii), 96 Stat. at 1481. 
76 Id. § 122 (f)(4)(A). 
77 Id. § 122 (f)(4)(B).  
78 Id. § 122 (b)(1)(A). 
79 Id. § 122 (b), 96 Stat. at 1482, 1483.  
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banks and thrifts that were insured by the FDIC and the FSLIC respectively.80 With 
this section, thrifts became more competitive with commercial banks. 
The Garn-St. Germain Act, therefore, seemed to be beneficial legislation for the thrift 
industry. The Act allowed thrifts to enter more diverse businesses than before, and to 
be offered financial support when they faced serious difficulties. It also eliminated the 
limits on interest rates so that thrifts could compete with other financial institutions, 
including commercial banks.  
With these two acts, DIDMCA and the Garn-St. Germain Act, thrifts were 
able to enter non-traditional markets that they had not done before. The acts also 
enabled thrifts to have more authority over their business. Altogether, these two acts 
were enacted to help the thrift industry by removing certain obstacles.   
2.  After the U.S. S&L Crisis 
After the S&L crisis, the U.S. government enacted two statutes to address the 
problems created by the crisis and to prevent another crisis in the future: the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and the 
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991(FDICIA).81 
(a)  The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 
These two Acts were enacted to resolve the crisis with the ultimate goal of 
minimizing future taxpayer losses following the S&L crisis. During the administration 
80 Id. § 326 (b)(1), 96 Stat. at 1500.  
81 Docking, supra note 1, at 20.   
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of President George Herbert Walker Bush, FIRREA was passed to solve the problem 
of failed savings associations. 82  Section 401(a)(1)(2) of FIRREA removed the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).83 And Section 401(e)(3) mandated all functions of 
the FHLBB and the FSLIC to be transferred to the Office of Thrift Supervision, the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the 
Federal Housing Finance Board, and authorized these new agencies to continue acting 
as the preceding agencies did.84 Section 206(a)(7) enabled the FDIC to manage the 
insurance funds, such as the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Association 
Insurance Fund.85 Section 501 created an Oversight Board to assist failed thrifts as a 
conservatorship or receivership.86  
The FIRREA heightened capital requirements on thrifts to prevent thrifts 
from engaging in high-risk activities.87 The Act not only empowered regulators with 
enhanced authority to supervise thrifts, but also increased the criminal and civil 
82  The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Aftermath, at 49, 
http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/7529/7710164/appendixes/ch11apx1.pdf. 
83 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 
401(a), 103 Stat. 183, 354 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 to 1833e). 
84 Id. § 401(e)(3), 103 Stat. at 356 (stating agencies should “continue to provide such services, on a 
reimbursable basis, until the transfer of such functions is complete; and consult with any such agency 
to coordinate and facilitate a prompt and reasonable transition.”).  
85 Id. § 206(a)(7), 103 Stat. at 196. 
86 Id. § 501(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 369. 
87 See supra note 82, at 49–50 (stating that the FIRREA had: “Increased the core-capital leverage 
requirement from 3% to 8% and imposed the same risk-based capital standards imposed on commercial 
banks”). 
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penalties thrifts faced for crimes they commit.88 However, although the Act increased 
regulations on thrifts to prevent another potential crisis, it was insufficient to solve all 
the problems that arose from the S&L crisis.89 In particular, the Act did not deal with 
intrinsic problems or insurance issues.90 In order to reinforce FIRREA, the U.S. 
government passed another statute, the FDICIA, which had a significant impact on the 
regulatory system of banks.91  
(b)  The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991 
The two purposes of the FDICIA were first, to recapitalize the Bank 
Insurance Fund (BIF), and second, to amend the banking regulatory system, including 
deposit insurance in order to protect taxpayers.92 Section 104 of FDICIA allowed the 
FDIC to recapitalize the bank insurance fund.93 This section allowed the Board of 
Directors to make assessment rates when the remaining funds held by the FDIC were 
equivalent or insufficient to the standard rates.94 With this section, the FDIC was able 
to sufficiently maintain the bank insurance fund.95 
Section 302 authorized the Board of Directors to create “a risk-based 
88 Id. at 50. 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
91 Id.   
92 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 
Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
93 Id. § 104, 105 Stat. at 2238.  
94 Id. § 104 (c)(1).  
95 Id. 
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assessment system” for financial institutions that were members of the FDIC.96 The 
assessment system was calculated half-yearly based on various situations.97 In order 
to reserve sufficient insurance funds, the Board of Directors conducted “semiannual 
assessments for insured depository institutions.” 98  When the FDIC calculated 
whether the insurance funds would be sufficient, it mostly relied on four factors: 
“expected operating expenses; case resolution expenditures and income; the effect of 
assessments on members’ earnings and capital, and; any other factors that the Board 
of Directors may deem appropriate.”99 The half-yearly assessment was required to be 
either equal to or more than $1,000 for each insured institution.100 Under Section 302, 
deposit insurance funds had to keep the yearly standard rate at “1.25 percent of 
estimated insured deposits; or a higher percentage of estimated insured deposits that 
the Board of Directors determines to be justified for that year by circumstances 
raising a significant risk of substantial future losses to the fund.”101 Some insured 
financial institutions were required to keep higher insurance premiums and more 
96 Id. § 302(b)(1)(A), 105 Stat. at 2345. 
97 Id. § 302(b)(1)(C), 105 Stat. at 2345, 2346 (stating: “the term ‘risk-based assessment system’ means 
a system for calculating a depository institution’s semiannual assessment based on- 
(i) the probability that the deposit insurance fund will incur a loss with respect to the institution, taking 
into consideration the risks attributable to- (I) different categories and concentrations of assets; (II) 
different categories and concentrations of liabilities, both insured and uninsured, contingent and 
noncontingent; and (III) any other factors the Corporation determines are relevant to assessing such 
probability; 
(ii) the likely amount of any such loss; and  
(iii) the revenue needs of the deposit insurance fund.”). 
98 Id. § 302(2)(A)(i), 105 Stat. at 2346. 
99 Id. § 302(2)(A)(ii).  
100 Id. § 302(2)(A)(iii). 
101 Id. § 302(2)(A)(iv). 
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capital according to the risk-based assessments.102  
To achieve the purposes of FDICIA, two provisions of the Act were very 
important: first was the prompt corrective action and the second was the least cost 
resolution.103 First, Section 131 stated that the purpose of the prompt corrective 
action was to resolve the problem of insured financial institutions having a bad effect 
on “the deposit insurance funds.”104 The prompt corrective action approach tried to 
promote a safe and sound financial atmosphere by requiring financial regulators to 
become much stricter on financial institutions that had bad capital.105 Pursuant to the 
Act, financial regulators were required to evaluate whether a financial institution is 
sound and safe.106 For instance, there were five capital classes, “well capitalized, 
adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, or critically 
undercapitalized,”107 and among these classes, financial institutions were evaluated 
102 Docking, supra note 1, at 21.  
103 Noelle Richards, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 100 YEARS 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Dec. 19, 1991), 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/49.  
104 § 131(a), 105 Stat. at 2236.   
105 Id.  
106 Id. § 131(b).  
107 Id. § 131(b)(1) (stating: “(1) Capital categories.— 
(A) Well capitalized.— An insured depository institution is ‘well capitalized’ if it significantly exceeds 
the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure; 
(B) Adequately capitalized.— An insured depository institution is ‘adequately capitalized’ if it meets 
the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure; 
(C) Undercapitalized.— An insured depository institution is ‘undercapitalized’ if it fails to meet the 
required minimum level for any relevant capital measure; 
(D) Significantly undercapitalized.— An insured depository institution is ‘significantly 
undercapitalized’ if it is significantly below the required minimum level for any relevant capital 
measure;  
(E) Critically undercapitalized.— An insured depository institution is ‘critically undercapitalized’ if it 
fails to meet any level specified under subsection (c)(3)(A).”  
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by financial regulators based on the financial institutions’ status.108 In this section, 
capital standards contained “a leverage limit, and a risk-based capital requirement,” 
but these standards could be revoked if the federal financial supervisors considered 
the standards to be an inappropriate way to implement this section.109  
If a financial institution was evaluated as undercapitalized, financial 
regulators were required to strictly supervise it, and if a financial institution was 
considered significantly undercapitalized, financial regulators were required to order 
it to be placed in a conservatorship or receivership.110 Several provisions could apply 
to undercapitalized financial institutions.111 The first provision limited the ability of 
undercapitalized institutions to distribute their capital, although certain exceptions 
applied.112 First, financial institutions were permitted by federal financial agencies to 
“repurchase, redeem, retire, or otherwise acquire shares or ownership interests,” if 
their “repurchase, redemption, retirement, or other acquisition” involved issuing 
additional shares or liabilities of the institution in the same or greater amount, and if 
such transactions decreased the institution’s liabilities or enhanced the institution’s 
financial soundness.113 
Secondly, undercapitalized institutions were not allowed to pay management 
108 Richards, supra note 103.  
109 § 131 (c)(1)(B)(ii), 105 Stat. at 2254.  
110 Richards, supra note 103. 
111 § 131(d), 105 Stat. at 2255.  
112 Id. § 131(d)(1)(A). 
113 Id. § 131 (d)(1)(B). 
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fees to those who controlled the institutions.114 In addition, federal financial agencies 
were required to monitor the current status of the institutions, and determine whether 
the institutions were complying with the restrictions and regulations.115 Also, the 
institutions were required to hand in “an acceptable capital restoration plan” to federal 
financial agencies.116 The undercapitalized institutions were limited in their ability to 
grow their assets unless three exceptions were met.117 The three exceptions were: the 
“institution’s capital restoration plan” was accepted by federal financial agencies; 
growth of whole assets complied with the capital restoration plan; or during the 
calendar quarter, the tangible equity to assets ratio rose fast enough to allow adequate 
capitalization within an acceptable period of time. 118 Last, the undercapitalized 
institutions were able to receive interest from other insured financial institutions that 
accepted deposits, or to expand an extra branch office and fresh line of business as 
long as three requirements were satisfied: the capital restoration plan was accepted by 
federal financial agencies; the institution followed the plan; and, the agencies verified 
that the proposed actions were compatible with the goals of both the plan and this 
section.119    
Federal financial agencies could implement several actions to deal with 
significantly undercapitalized financial institutions that failed to comply with 
114 Id. § 131(d)(2). 
115 Id. § 131(e)(1), 105 Stat. at 2256. 
116 Id. § 131(e)(2). 
117 Id. § 131(e)(3), 105 Stat. at 2257.  
118 Id. § 131(e)(3). 
119 Id. § 131(e)(4), 105 Stat. at 2257, 2258.  
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regulations such as submitting the capital restoration plan and carrying out an 
approved plan.120 The first action was to require recapitalization under which the 
federal banking agencies had the power to demand that institutions keep adequate 
capitalization by selling shares, voting shares, and obligations.121 If an institution was 
almost placed in a conservator or receiver, they had to be taken over by a financial 
holding company or merged with another financial institution.122  
The second action was to restrict the transactions with affiliates by the 
institutions.123 The next one was to limit institutions from providing higher interests 
on deposits than their competitors in the local area, but no retroactive application was 
allowed.124 Institutions also had limits on increasing their assets, or were demanded 
to decrease their assets.125 The federal banking agencies demanded the institutions, 
including their subsidiaries, not to undertake activities that may pose a high risk.126 
The institutions were also required to develop their management, such as electing a 
new director, discharging directors, and hiring proven “senior executive officers.”127 
In addition, the institutions were not allowed to receive deposits from “correspondent 
banks,” and a bank holding company of any institution was allowed to distribute 
120 Id. § 131(f)(1), 105 Stat. 2258. 
121 Id. § 131(f)(2)(A). 
122 Id.   
123 Id. § 131(f)(2)(B). 
124 Id. § 131(f)(2)(C), 105 Stat. 2258, 2259. 
125 Id. § 131(f)(2)(D), 105 Stat. 2259.  
126 Id. § 131(f)(2)(E). 
127 Id. §131(f)(2)(F). 
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capital only if the BHC received approval from the FRB in advance.128 Lastly, the 
institutions or their parent companies, including depository institutions, subsidiaries, 
but not non-depository ones, were required to divest themselves if they were 
considered to have a negative effect on financial stability.129   
For critically undercapitalized financial institutions, several restrictions and 
requirements were put in place under which such institutions were not allowed to pay 
for any subordinated debt within sixty days after becoming critically undercapitalized, 
and the institutions were required to be placed in a conservatorship and a receivership 
within ninety days after falling into the critically undercapitalized category.130 Also, 
critically undercapitalized financial institutions were prohibited from carrying out 
activities such as doing unusual business, increasing the credit on any leveraged 
business, revising any charter and bylaws of the institutions, changing their 
“accounting method,” doing business under Section “23A(b) of the Federal Reserve 
Act,” providing substantial remunerations or extra rewards, or providing interest on 
debts that were much higher than normal rates on the market.131 However, if a 
financial institution had prior approval from the Corporation, they were allowed to do 
such activities.132  
Last, under the “transition rule,” the OTS’s role of caring for insured savings 
128 Id. § 131(f)(2)(G)-(H).  
129 Id. § 131(f)(2)(I). 
130 Id. § 131(h)(2)(A)-(3)(A), 105 Stat. at 2261. 
131 Id. § 131(i)(2), Stat. at 2261, 2263. 
132 Id. 
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associations could not be reduced by the role of the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC).133 In addition, the Act provided a grace period for some savings associations 
that had, before the FDICIA was enacted, handed in a plan complying with “section 
5(t)(6)(A)(ii) of the Home Owner’s Loan Act.”134 As long as such plan was accepted 
by the Director of the OTS and remained in effect, and if the savings associations 
complied with the plan or were operating pursuant to a written agreement with the 
relevant federal banking agency, they were exempted from complying with 
“subsections (e)(2), (f), and (h)” of the Act.135  
In accordance with FDICIA, financial regulators were therefore able to 
strictly supervise and regulate a financial institution that could have financial 
problems, and thereby play a role in preventing another financial crisis.136 In addition 
to the prompt corrective action, “the least cost resolution” was also one of the 
significant provisions of FDICIA. The purpose of the provision was to spend the least 
amount of money on solving the financial crisis by demanding the FDIC to find out 
the best way to cut down the cost for taxpayers.137 However, this provision did not 
apply to “too big to fail” cases.138  
Section 141 enabled the FDIC to assist its insured financial institutions only 
133 Id. § 131(o)(1), Stat. at 2265, 2266. 
134 Id. § 131(o)(2), Stat. at 2266. 
135 Id.  
136 Richards, supra note 103. 
137 Id.  
138 Larry D. Wall, Too Big to Fail after FDICIA, at 1, (Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Nov.1, 
2010).  
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when the FDIC needed to serve “insurance coverage” as part of its duty to 
problematic institutions. 139  The FDIC was responsible for providing least-cost 
insurance coverage to its members by using two methods.140 Section 141 required the 
FDIC to do “present-value analysis and documentation” in which the FDIC took 
advantage of practical reduced price to assess current worth as a substitute, and collect 
documentation which included the assessment and the presumption about “interest 
rates, asset recovery rates, asset holding costs, and payment of contingent 
liabilities.” 141  This section also required the U.S. government to give up tax 
revenues.142  
When insured depository institutions were under a conservatorship or 
receivership, “the determination of the costs of liquidation” had to be made on the 
first occurrence of the appointment of conservator, appointment of receivership, or 
determination by the FDIC to provide assistance.143 When the FDIC decided to assist 
an institution, the expense had to be set as soon as possible.144 The cost of liquidating 
institutions could not be greater than “the amount which is equal to the sum of the 
insured deposits of such institution as of the earliest of” the above events, minus “the 
present value of the total net amount the FDIC reasonably expects to receive from the 
139 § 141(4)(A), Stat. at 2273, 2274. 
140 Id. § 141(B), Stat. at 2274.  
141 Id. § 141(B)(i). 
142 Id. § 141(B)(ii). 
143 Id. § 141(C)(ii). 
144 Id. 
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disposition of the assets of such institution in connection with such liquidation.”145 In 
addition to the cost of liquidation, the deposit insurance funds could not be used to 
protect depositors and creditors even if a troubled institution could have an 
enormously negative effect on the funds.146  
Under 141 (E)(iii), persons or entities who purchased and assumed “liabilities 
of insured depository institutions for which the Corporation has been appointed 
conservator or receiver,” could still acquire such institutions’ uninsured deposit 
liabilities, “if the insurance fund does not incur any loss concerning such deposit 
liabilities in an amount greater than the loss which would have been incurred with 
respect to such liabilities, if the institution had been liquidated.” 147 Lastly, this 
Section permitted the FDIC, prior to the conservatorship or receivership, to assist 
troubled insured depository institutions only when the institutions were fully expected 
to be under the conservatorship or receivership.148 Institutions that complied with 
other regulations, but seemed likely to be under a conservatorship or receivership in 
the future and not recover unless assisted by the FDIC, could be supported by the 
FDIC prior to the conservatorship or receivership.149    
Congress believed that it was imperative for the federal banking agencies to 
provide an “early resolution of troubled insured depository institutions” so long as the 
145 Id. § 141(D), Stat. at 2274, 2275. 
146 Id. §141(E)(i), Stat. at 2275. 
147 Id. §141(E)(iii). 
148 Id. §141(e), Stat. at 2278. 
149 Id. 
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cost-impact of the early resolution on the deposit insurance fund would be low and the 
early resolution was consistent with FDIA’s corrective action provisions.150 The 
agencies were encouraged to follow a number of standards when making the early 
decision. 151  One of the standards was that the decision-action should be a 
“competitive negotiation” to quickly deal with problems that may have significantly 
negative effects on the depository insurance funds.152 Institutions, including the 
“resulting institution,” needed to comply with relevant capital principals when they 
took over problematic banks.153  
In addition, “substantial private investment” had to be involved in the action, 
and “the preexisting owners and debtholders” of problematic institutions, including 
holding companies, were required to give massive concessions.154 Under Section 143, 
the directors and management of the resulting institutions were required to meet 
qualifications, and individuals who were deeply involved in the problems of the 
troubled institutions were prohibited from serving as directors or managers of the 
resulting institutions.155 The resolution enabled the FDIC to engage in “the success of 
the resulting institution.”156 Lastly, FDIC’s responsibility for the actions was limited, 
150 Id. § 143, Stat. at 2281.  
151 Id. § 143(b). 
152 Id. § 143(b)(1). 
153 Id. § 143(b)(2), Stat. at 2281, 2282.  
154 Id. § 143(b)(3)-(4), Stat. at 2282. 
155 Id. § 143(b)(5). 
156 Id. § 143(b)(6). 
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and new venture capitalists were required to take on some risk with the FDIC.157   
Section 241 of the Act stated that the purpose of the “FDIC affordable 
housing program” was to assist families that earned low salaries, and to help them 
afford houses or rental homes.158 The FDIC created the affordable housing program 
office whose purpose was to assist a particular group of people: those who were 
facing home foreclosures.159  
Section 304 of the Act restricted the land lending that federal financial 
agencies should accept consistent with regulations regarding principles of “extension 
of credits” that should be “secured by liens on interests in real estate; or made for the 
purpose of financing the construction of a building or other improvements to real 
estate,” within nine months after FDICIA was effective.160 The principles that the 
agencies were required to consider were: risk of the extension of credits posed to the 
insurance funds for deposit, safety and soundness of the financial institutions, and 
“the availability of credit.”161 Also, there were several categories of loans that the 
federal agency needed to distinguish based on compliance with federal regulations 
including warranty of the risk to the fund, and warranty of the soundness and safety of 
insured depository institutions.162  
157 Id. § 143(b)(7). 
158 Id. § 241(a), Stat. at 2317.   
159 Richards, supra note 103. 
160 § 304(a), Stat. at 2354. 
161 Id. § 304 (o)(2)(A). 
162 Id. § 304 (o)(2)(B). 
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Section 263 required depository institutions to unambiguously disclose 
detailed interest rates, including precise yield, on either demand accounts or interest-
bearing accounts when the institutions were advertised.163 By doing so, depositors 
could be protected by the disclosed information about those kinds of accounts. 
However, an exception applied to depository institutions when they advertised the 
information through mass media, where they were not required to state specific 
information about the minimum deposit required for a new account and deductible 
yield. 164  Finally, depository institutions were enjoined from stating misleading 
statements of “deposit contracts,” and “Free or No-Cost accounts” through any 
advertisement.165  
Section 301 of the Act limited “brokered deposits” and “deposit 
solicitations”.166 Under §1831f (a), insured depository institutions that were not well 
capitalized were prohibited from receiving funds obtained “by or through” deposit 
brokers, either “directly or indirectly.” 167  There were two exceptions to this 
prohibition: permission by the Corporation and exceptions for conservatorships.168 
Under §1831f (e), “insured depository institutions” that were allowed to receive funds 
under these two exceptions were prohibited from paying “a rate of interest for such 
funds” exceeding, “at the time of acceptance of such funds,” either “the rate paid on 
163 Id. § 263(a), Stat. at 2334, 2335.  
164 Id. § 263(b), Stat. at 2335. 
165 Id. § 263(c)-(d). 
166 Id. § 301, Stat. at 2343. 
167 Id. § 301(e), Stat. at 2344.  
168 Id. 
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deposits of similar maturity in such institution’s normal market area for deposits 
accepted in the institution’s normal market area” or “the national rate paid on deposits 
of comparable maturity, as established by the Corporation, for deposits accepted 
outside the institution’s normal market area.”169 This act limited deposit solicitation 
that undercapitalized “insured depository institutions,” in their efforts to solicit 
deposits, and were not allowed to offer rates “significantly higher than the prevailing 
rates interest” in their “normal market areas,” or in other market areas where deposits 
would be deposited.170 
In conclusion, the primary purpose of FIRREA and FDICIA was to solve the 
crisis and to prevent another crisis, including protecting taxpayers by reforming 
operations, regulatory systems, and rules, and by recapitalizing the bank insurance 
fund. Through FIRREA, the government tried to save the problematic savings 
institutions by reforming regulatory agencies171 and by authorizing the FDIC to assist 
the troubled institutions.172 Pursuant to the Act, the FDIC was responsible for the BIF 
by recapitalizing and assessing the fund.173 In addition to FIRREA, the prompt 
corrective actions and the least cost resolution of FDICIA were significant provisions 
to achieve the purpose of the Act.174 With the prompt corrective action, regulatory 
agencies could supervise regulated thrifts based on their capital categories, which 
169 Id. § 301(e)(1)-(2). 
170 Id. § 301(h), Stat. at 2345. 
171 Supra note 84. 
172 Supra note 85. 
173 Id. 
174 Supra note 103. 
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ranged from well capitalized to critically undercapitalized.175 Thus, according to the 
categories of the thrifts, regulators could take immediate regulatory actions on the 
thrifts, or place the thrift in a conservatorship or receivership. With the least cost 
resolution, the government tried to spend the least cost to solve the financial crisis.176 
In the event of a thrift failure, the FDIC must consider on a case-by-case basis 
whether the FDIC should assist the failed thrift and spend the cost. 
C.  Prior to the Mortgage Crisis 
The U.S. mortgage crisis of 2008, considered the biggest crisis since the 
Great Depression, had a tremendous impact on the financial industry and on the 
global economy. Many factors contributed to the mortgage crisis; one of the biggest 
causes was lenient regulation on the financial industry. Prior to the crisis, Section 509 
of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”) allowed low-income people to 
get loans.177 Pursuant to this section, financial institutions were able to make loans to 
a group of people that had little or no ability to pay back their loans.178 Financial 
institutions justified the loans by claiming they benefited local communities. 179 
However, financial institutions could not make loans unless making a loan would be 
175 Supra note 107. 
176 Supra note 137. 
177 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 509, Stat. 1111, 1141 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.§§ 2901-2908 (2012)).  
178 Id.  
179 Docking, supra note 1, at 22. 
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safe and sound.180  
Prior to the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 (“IBBEA”), banking institutions were only able to do business, including 
acquisitions, within their home states. 181 However, IBBEA enabled the banking 
industry to do business out of their home states, allowing banks to expand and open 
and operate branches in other states.182 Section 101 of the Act permitted the Board to 
approve bank holding companies that were of good capitalization and management 
“to acquire control of, or acquire all or substantially all of the assets of, a bank located 
in a State other than the home State of such bank holding company, without regard to 
whether such transaction is prohibited under the law of any State.”183  
The Act, however, prohibited bank holding companies from doing any 
interstate business such as acquisitions, if they did not meet the minimum years of 
existence requirement under the “statutory law of the host State.”184 An exception 
allowed bank holding companies to do business in a host state regardless of the 
“statutory law of the host State,” if they had been in existence for more than five 
years.185 The IBBEA preserved State contingency laws when four of the following 
180 Id.  
181 See id. 
182 Id.  
183 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 
101(d)(1)(A), Stat. 2338, 2339 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
184 Id. § 101(d)(B), Stat. at 2339.   
185 Id.  
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terms were met:186 if the state law did not discriminate against “out-of State Banks, 
out-of-State bank holding companies, or subsidiaries of such banks or bank holding 
companies”; if the state law was enacted earlier than the IBBEA; if the FDIC made no 
determination that abiding the State law would cause “an unacceptable risk to the 
appropriate deposit insurance fund”; and if the Federal banking agency in charge for 
such bank did not find that abiding by State law would cause adverse conditions.187   
The Act placed a cap on the concentration of bank holding companies by 
imposing both nationwide concentration limits and “statewide concentration limits 
other than with respect to initial entries.” 188  The Act established nationwide 
concentration limits by prohibiting banking holding companies controlling, or 
companies that would control after the acquisition, ten percent of the “total amount of 
deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States” from conducting 
acquisitions.189 The Act also imposed “statewide concentration limits other than with 
respect to initial entries” by preventing bank holding companies controlling “any 
insured depository institution in the home State of any bank to be acquired or in any 
host State in which any such bank maintains a branch” and will “control thirty percent 
or more of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in any such 
State” from conducting acquisitions.190 However, there was an exception to the 
limitation on statewide concentration which permitted applicants to carry out 
186 Id. §101(d)(D). 
187 Id. § 101(d)(D), Stat. at 2339, 2340. 
188 Id. § 101(d)(2), Stat.at 2340.  
189 Id. § 101(d)(2)(A).  
190 Id. § 101(d)(2)(B).  
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acquisitions if state law permitted control of “a greater percentage of total deposits of 
all insured depository institutions in the State than the percentage permitted” under 
the statewide concentration clause of the IBBEA, and if the state bank supervisor gave 
permission for the acquisition, and such permission was given based on a non-
discriminatory standard.191     
Prior to the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), giant 
companies were not allowed to further increase their size by using financial holding 
companies.192 However, after GLBA was enacted, large companies began to have 
opportunities to do business through holding companies.193 The Act enabled financial 
holding companies to participate in new activities that they had not previously 
participated in, such as “underwriting and selling insurance and securities, conducting 
both commercial and merchant banking investing in and developing real estate and 
other complimentary activities.”194 Section 103 of GLBA enabled financial holding 
companies to participate in the activities that were “financial in nature or incidental to 
such financial activity,” that did not cause significant risks to “depository institutions 
or the financial system generally.”195  
The determination whether the activities were “financial in nature or 
incidental to such financial activity” was made by the Board consulting the Secretary 
191 Id. § 101(d)(2)(D). 
192 See Docking, supra note 1, at 22. 
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103(k)(1), 113 Stat. 1138, 1342 (1999) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§6801-6809 (2012)). 
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of the Treasury.196 When determining whether the activities were “in financial nature 
or incidental to a financial activity,” the Board was required to consider three 
factors.197 First, the Board was obligated to consider the purpose of the Bank Holding 
Company Act and the GLBA.198 Second, the Board had to take into account the 
changes in the marketplace and the “technology for delivering financial services.”199 
Third, the Board was required to consider whether the activity under review is 
“necessary or appropriate to allow a financial holding company and their affiliates” to 
facilitate effective competition, provide efficient delivery of information and services 
and to offer customers “any available or emerging technological means for using 
financial services or for the document imaging data.”200 Under this Act, financial 
holding companies could participate in new activities, which set the stage for the 
emergence of big banks and the “too big to fail” mentality.201 In addition to the acts 
mentioned above, the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 also contributed 
to the crisis by increasing insurance coverage for a certain retirement account from 
$100,000 to $250,000.202  
In conclusion, these five acts contributed to the financial crisis by enabling 
thrifts to expand their business, including allowing them to make loans to low-income 
196 Id. § 103(k)(2)(A).  
197 Id. § 103(k)(3), 113 Stat. at 1343. 
198 Id. § 103(k)(3)(A). 
199 Id. §103(k)(3)(B)-(C). 
200 Id. § 103(k)(3)(D). 
201 See Docking, supra note 1, at 22. 
202 Id.  
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people, to do business in other states, and to participate in new activities through bank 
holding companies with lenient regulations. 
D.  After the Mortgage Crisis of 2008  
After the mortgage crisis took place, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) and the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”) were enacted not only to solve the crisis but also 
to prevent future crises. In particular, the EESA was enacted to solve the problems of 
troubled assets, to create a safe and sound financial market, and to revitalize the 
economy.203  
Congress declared that the purpose of the EESA was to “provide authority for 
the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the 
purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy and 
financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain 
expiring provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other 
purposes.”204 Section 101 of the Act gave power to the Secretary to build a “Troubled 
Asset Relief Program” (“TARP”) to “purchase and to make and fund commitments to 
purchase troubled assets” held by financial institutions.205  
203 Kevin L. Petrasic et al., Paul Hastings, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: 
Summary, Analysis and Implementation (Oct. 2008) at 1, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1031.pdf. 
204 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) 
(codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261 (2008)). 
205 Id. § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3765, 3767. 
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Section 102(a)(1) allowed the Secretary to create a guarantee program for the 
troubled assets.206 The Secretary was required to purchase only those troubled assets 
that were “originated or issued before March 14 2008, including mortgage-backed 
securities.”207 Under Section 115(a)(3) the Secretary could not purchase toxic assets 
greater than $700 billion if the President’s report on details of how the Secretary 
would excise the authority was submitted to Congress, and no joint resolution was 
enacted within fifteen calendar days from the submission of such report.208   
Section 106 (d) required the Secretary to deposit the proceeds from the sale of 
troubled assets to the Treasury. 209  Further, banks could receive better lending 
conditions by receiving capital from the Treasury pursuant to the Act.210 These 
provisions helped the financial institutions recover. 
Section 136 of the Act established a temporary increase of the insurance 
coverage under Section 11(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Depository Insurance Act (FDIA) 
from $100,000 to $250,000.211 Although it was meant to be a temporary measure, the 
Dodd-Frank Act later established it as a permanent.212 This increased insurance 
coverage is expected to have positive effects on the financial market by ensuring a 
206 Id. § 102(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3769. 
207 Id.  
208 Id. § 115(a)(3), 122 Stat. 3780. 
209 Id. § 106(d), 122 Stat. 3773. 
210 Lamont Black & Lieu Hazelwood, The Effect of TARP on Bank Risk-Taking 1, (Int’l Fin. 
Discussion, FRB, Mar. 2012). 
211 § 136(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3799.  
212 See Infra text accompanying p. 114 for more information on the increased insurance coverage.  
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greater level of protection for depositors, but at the same time, there are concerns that 
such measures might cause moral hazards.    
Several organizations were created to supervise and analyze the TARP. 
Section 104 created the “Financial Stability Oversight Board” (“FSOB”) responsible 
for reviewing TARP, including TARP’s effects on “preserving home ownership, 
stabilizing financial markets, and protecting taxpayers.”213 This section also required 
the TARP to make recommendations and reports on any illegal conduct.214 Section 
121 of the Act created “the Office of the Special Inspector General for TARP” to audit 
and examine the actions of purchasing, managing, and selling troubled assets that the 
Secretary purchases and guarantees.215 Section 125 also created “the Congressional 
Oversight Panel” to analyze the financial market and its regulations, and submit a 
report of the findings to legislators.216 
The Office of Management and Budget was required to report an estimate of 
how much it would cost to purchase and guarantee troubled assets, and to show how 
the calculation was done.217 It was also required to report how such estimates 
affected loss and liabilities.218  
Financial institutions that sold their troubled assets to the Secretary were 
213 § 104(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3770, 3771. 
214 Id. § 104(a)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3771. 
215 Id. § 121(c), 122 Stat. at 3788. 
216 Id. § 125(b), 122 Stat. at 3791. 
217 Id. § 202 (b)(1)-(2), 122 Stat. at 3800. 
218 Id. § 202(b)(3). 
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required to meet certain standards of executive compensation and corporate 
governance. Section 111(b) stated that financial institutions were limited to the 
compensation rules set by the Secretary. 219  Section 111(c) prohibited financial 
institutions from providing a “golden Parachute” to any executive officer if the 
institutions were under the auction purchases where the financial institutions sold 
more than $300 million of their assets.220  
In conclusion, the EESA was drafted in an effort to manage troubled assets by 
providing financial support to struggling financial institutions, and by tightening 
financial regulations. Its drafters also attempted to stabilize the financial market, and 
to revitalize the U.S. economy. This Act was one of the solutions to deal with the 
mortgage crisis of 2008, and to prevent a future crisis.  
The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted not only to alleviate the aftermath of the 
mortgage crisis of 2008, but also to prevent another crisis in the future. The purpose 
of the Act was to build up a stable, safe, and sound financial environment by 
protecting financial consumers and taxpayers.221 Like the related preceding Acts, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was drafted in order to attack the misconception of “too big to 
fail.”222 How to combat the “too big to fail” mentality has been one of the hardest 
219 Id. § 111(b), 122 Stat. at 3776. 
220 Id. § 111(c), 122 Stat. at 3777. 
221 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
222 See Docking, supra note 1, at 25 (stating that the U.S government requires big financial institutions 
to prepare for future failures they may meet in the future, and regarding the failure, these institutions 
must submit their plans how to dissolve themselves in the event of failures to regulatory agencies so 
that the agencies will be appropriately ready to close failed institutions. If these institutions failed to 
submit the plan to regulatory agencies, the institutions will receive many disadvantages, including 
112 
 
                                           
questions that the U.S. legislature and the executive have been faced with; whether 
the Dodd-Frank Act will contribute to resolving the “too big to fail” problem remains 
uncertain.223  
Section 111 of the Act established the “Financial Stability Oversight Council” 
(“FSOC”), which consists of the heads of all regulatory agencies and governmental 
corporations, and the Secretary of the Treasury was assigned as the chairperson of this 
council.224 It is the responsibility of the council to analyze risks in financial markets, 
to intensify market regulations, and to take action against any potential hazards that 
pose a risk to the financial market.225 In order to maintain stable financial market 
conditions, Section 112(a)(2) required the council to monitor financial markets and 
regulations, to discover any threats to the market, and to make recommendations to 
regulatory agencies on whether more intensive regulations could be put on financial 
institutions.226  
Section 152 created the “Office of Financial Research” (“OFR”) whose head 
is appointed by the President with the Senate’s consent.227 Section 153 declared that 
the OFR was established to assist the FSOC by gathering data and by undertaking 
research with respect to systemic risks, financial market conditions, and any threats to 
much stringent regulations, restrictions for business, and fine). 
223 See id. at 26.  
224 § 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1392, 1393. 
225 Id. § 111(j)(a), 124 Stat. at 1394, 1395.  
226 Id. § 112(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1395. 
227 Id. § 152(a)-(b), 124 Stat. at 1413. 
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the market.228  
Responding to the mortgage crisis, the U.S. government abolished the Office 
of Thrift Supervision by transferring its role and authority to other regulatory 
agencies.229 Because the regulations and supervisions on the thrift industry by the 
OTS had shown poor performance, the OTS was abolished. 230  Section 312 
transferred all powers and functions of the OTS to the Board of Governors, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.231 
In addition to the restructuring of the regulatory system of the thrift industry, Section 
335 permanently increased the insurance coverage for deposits up to $250,000.232 As 
discussed earlier, the EESA temporarily increased the coverage up to $250,000, and 
this section permanently increased it. 
Under 165(a)(1), Congress required the Board of Governors to establish 
“prudential standards” for both the nonbank financial companies under the 
supervision of the Board of Governors, and the bank holding companies that had at 
least fifty billion dollars in total consolidated assets.233 The drafters demanded that 
such regulations should be “more stringent than the standards and requirements 
applicable to nonbank financial companies and bank holding companies” that did not 
228 Id. § 153(a), 124 Stat. at 1415. 
229 V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 2, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf. 
230 See KATHLEEN, supra note 6, at 174–184.  
231 § 312(b), 124 Stat. 1521, 1522. 
232 Id. § 335(a), 124 Stat. at 1540. 
233 Id. § 165(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1423. 
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carry with them similar risks. 234  Section 165(a)(2)(A) permitted the Board of 
Governors to provide tailored applications to companies under review by considering 
their specific characteristics, including “capital structure, riskiness, complexity, 
financial activities, size and any other risk-related factors that the Board of Governors 
deems appropriate.”235 Section 165(a)(2)(B) allowed the Board of Governors to set 
“an asset threshold” of more than $50 billion in order for the standards created under 
Section 165(c) through (g) to apply.236  
Section 165(b)(1)(A) required the Board of Governors to set “prudential 
standards” for nonbank financial companies and large bank holding companies with 
total consolidated assets of fifty billion dollars or more.237 This Section made the 
Board of Governors responsible for establishing “prudential standards” that included 
“risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits, liquidity requirements, overall 
risk management requirements, resolution plan and credit exposure report 
requirements as well as concentration limits.”238 The nonbank financial companies 
and bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of fifty billion dollars or 
more also became subject to additional standards, such as “a contingent capital 
requirement; enhanced public disclosures; short-term debt limits; such other 
prudential standards as the Board of Governors, on its own or pursuant to a 
recommendation made by the Council in accordance with section 115, determines are 
234 Id.  
235 Id. § 165(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1423, 1424. 
236 Id. § 165(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1424. 
237 Id. § 165(b)(1)(A). 
238 Id.   
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appropriate.”239  
Section 165(b)(3) required the Board of Governors to consider differences 
among the bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies based on 
several factors, including risk-related elements, the companies’ balance sheets, off-
balance sheets, and whether or not they had financial institutions that accepted 
deposits.240 Section 166 required the Board of Governors to set early remediation to 
assist troubled financial institutions defined in subsection (a) of Section 165.241  
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act is known as the Volker rule, which sets 
limitations on “proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and 
private equity funds.”242 This Section prevented bank entities from participating in 
proprietary trading. 243  Bank entities were not allowed to support or possess 
connections with “a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”244 Although there were 
exceptions to the limitations of Section 619, the exceptions do not apply if the 
activities would pose a significant risk to the financial market.245  
Section 712 conferred authorities to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate a swap market, 
239 Id. § 165(b)(1)(B). 
240 Id. § 165(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1424,1425. 
241 Id. § 166(a), 124 Stat. at 1432. 
242 12 U.S.C. 1851(a). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id.  
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and both agencies had to cooperate in dealing with the market.246 In order to achieve 
transparency and accountability of the swap market, Section 727 required the SEC to 
provide the swap transaction data to the public.247 Section 764 required “swap dealers 
and major security-based swap participants” to register that they are the dealers or the 
participants.248 More recent regulations were introduced to achieve transparency and 
accountability in the swap market.249 Although the swap market did not contribute to 
the mortgage crisis, Congress created these provisions as a preventive measure.250   
Section 932 created the “Office of Credit Ratings” (“OCR”) under the SEC to 
regulate the “National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (“NRSRO”) in 
order to supervise whether the NRSRO was appropriately deciding credit ratings, and 
protecting customers and the public interest related to the credit ratings.251 The OCR 
also regulated the NRSRO to promote the accuracy of the credit rating issued by the 
NRSRO, and to guarantee that any conflicts of interest would not affect NRSRO’s 
decisions regarding the issuance of the credit rating.252  
Section 941 introduced the “securitizer.”253 Pursuant to this provision, the 
246 Supra note 221, § 712(a), 124 Stat. 1641-1642. 
247 7 U.S.C. 2(13)(b). 
248 Supra note 221, § 764, 124 Stat. 1785.  
249 PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants 1 (Jan. 2011). 
250 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Clients & Friends Memo, The Lincoln Amendment: Banks, 
Swap Dealers, National Treatment and the Future of the Amendment 2 (Dec. 2010). 
251 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 
932(p)(1), 124 Stat. 1877 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
252 Id.  
253 The term ‘securitizer’ means (A) an issuer of an asset-backed security; or (B) a person who 
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OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC with joint cooperation with the SEC were required to 
regulate the securitizer by requiring them to keep an “economic interest in a portion of 
the credit risk” when they made transactions with third parties.254 In addition, the 
securitizer was required to keep not more than five-percent of “the credit risk for any 
asset.”255  
Section 951 enabled shareholders to approve executive compensation.256 
Section 1011 established the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection” (“BCFP”) to 
protect financial consumers by mandating that financial institutions provide financial 
services and products in compliance with “the Federal consumer financial laws.”257 
The BCFP was created as a sub-organization under the FRB, but it was an 
independent agency with its own director and deputy director.258 The establishment 
of the bureau is expected to improve the quality and the fairness of financial 
institutions, resulting in better services that financial consumers can enjoy.  
Section 1411 allowed creditors to make “a residential mortgage loan” to 
borrowers only with appropriate evidence that borrowers had the ability to pay loans 
back to creditors.259 The evidence must be based on the borrower’s financial history 
organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities transaction by selling or transferring assets, either 
directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer. Id. § 941(b), 124 Stat. at 1891. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. § 941(b), 124 Stat. at 1891,1892. 
256 Id. § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899. 
257 Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
258 Id. § 1011(a)-(b). 
259 Id. § 1411(a), 124 Stat. at 2142. 
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and current information, such as the borrower’s current and future income, as well as 
how much debt the borrower would have in the coming years.260 This provision was 
established to make sure borrowers of residential mortgage loans have the ability to 
repay the loan, and if they do not, creditors could not make such loans. Because bad 
loans were one of the significant causes of the mortgage crisis, this provision seems to 
be another preventive measure against any future crisis. 
In conclusion, the U.S. government tried to create a stable and safe financial 
environment by adding multiple regulations and limitations, and creating several 
agencies to create regulations, research, and monitor the condition of the financial 
market and, financial activities, and provide protections for financial consumers.   
E.  The Korean Savings Bank Crisis  
The Korean savings bank crisis began in 2010, and caused the failure of one 
fifth of the total savings banks in the nation, including the largest savings bank and 
other major savings banks.261 Since the crisis, it has been argued that savings banks 
are no longer needed at all because savings banks have already lost their purpose. The 
causes of the crisis were deregulation, inappropriate after-measures, such as 
acquisitions, and moral hazard of large and controlling shareholders.262 Because of 
the crisis, the Korean government spent more than $26 billion, and the number of 
260 Id. § 1411(a), 124 Stat. at 2143. 
261 Kim, Tae-jong, 4 Savings Banks Suspended, THE KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at 
http://www,koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/05/123_110426.html; Choi, Myeong-yong, KDIC, 
26 Savings Banks Declared As Poor Financial Institutions for Three-Year, NEWS1, May 23, 2013, 
http://news1.kr/articles/1145314. 
262 Chamyeoyondae (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), Five Major Failures of Savings 
Banks Policy & 26 Responsible Officials, ISSUE REPORT, 1, 4 Mar. 29, 2012, 
http://www.peoplepower21.org/885934. 
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victims stands at more than 100,000.263  
F.  Before & After the Korean Savings Bank Crisis  
In March 2002, the official title of “savings and financial companies” was 
changed to “mutual savings banks.”264 The same institutions, but with a new title 
were able to participate in a greater variety of activities than before.265 Although the 
savings banks had more limitations compared to the commercial banks, savings banks 
were permitted to have branches.266 The Korean government also deregulated savings 
banks, and encouraged larger and healthier savings banks to acquire insolvent savings 
banks by giving them several incentives. 267 In addition, insurance coverage for 
savings bank deposits was increased. 268  With these favorable conditions, large 
shareholders of savings banks could engage in high-risk and high-return investments. 
The combination of these multiple factors caused the savings bank crisis. Since the 
crisis, inspection by the governments of large shareholders has become much more 
intensified given that shareholder’s moral hazard was also one of the biggest reasons 
for the crisis.269  
263 Kim, Ji-hwan, Savings Bank Crisis Is Financial Accident, Costing $26 Billion with 100 Thousand 
Victims, KYUNGHYANG, Oct. 26, 2012, 
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201210262120315&code=920301. 
264 Sangho jeochukeunhaengbeob [Mutual Savings Banks Act], Act No. 12100, Aug. 13, 2013, art. 9, 
11(1) (S. Kor.). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. art. 4, 7.  
267 Choi, supra note 4, at 202–203. 
268 Id. at 201. 
269 See supra note 264, art. 22(6). 
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G.  Comparing the U.S. S&L Crisis, the U.S. Mortgage Crisis of 2008, and the 
Korea Crisis 
 1.  The S&L Crisis and the Mortgage Crisis of 2008 
The S&L Crisis and the mortgage crisis of 2008 have very similar causes and 
solutions. The similar causes were deregulation, fluctuant interest rates, risky lending, 
moral hazard, and inappropriate regulations.270 The real estate crash, delinquencies, 
and asset securitization were also causes.271 Multiple solutions to the crises were also 
similar.272 The similarities in the U.S. government’s solutions included: increasing 
depository insurance coverage, removing existing regulatory systems as a punishment 
of regulatory agencies, and intensifying the standard of regulation and supervision 
after the crisis.273    
Deregulation from regulatory agencies took place in both crises, and the thrift 
industry benefited from more lenient regulations. Due to the lenient regulations, 
thrifts were able to engage in high-risk and high-return activities, which was one of 
the significant causes of the S&Ls crisis. Thrifts received lenient regulations from 
regulatory agencies because thrifts had serious operating difficulties due to the 
disintermediation after double-digit interest rates were placed on markets.274 Similar 
to the S&L crisis, there was also deregulation prior to the mortgage crisis of 2008. 
270 Docking, supra note 1, at 18.  
271 Id.  
272 Id.  
273 See id.  
274 Id. 
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The regulatory agency for the U.S. thrift industry was the OTS, and it put lenient 
regulations on the industry because the agency wanted to keep thrifts under their 
supervision by receiving assessment fees, which comprised a significant portion of 
their operating budget.275 If they put too stringent regulations on the industry, thrifts 
would change their supervisory agency to the OCC. As a result, in order to not lose 
the industry to other agencies, such as the OCC, the OTS loosened its level of 
supervision on the thrifts.  
The deregulation not only enabled thrifts to engage in risky investment but 
also resulted in risky lending, moral hazard, and inappropriate supervisions. If 
regulatory agencies had put more intense regulations on thrifts, risky lending practices 
and moral hazard could have been avoided. Regarding inappropriate supervisions, 
lenient regulations were the primary cause, but the quality of thrift regulators was also 
worse than regulators of the commercial banking industry.276  
The real estate crash, delinquencies, and asset securitization also contributed 
to the crisis.277 Thrifts are very closely related to the real estate market. When the 
housing market is in good condition, thrifts have less credit risks because people who 
borrow money from thrifts as real estate mortgage loans are more likely to make 
275 See KATHLEEN, supra note 6, at 179 (Although the OTS was aware of the fact that the WAMU had 
to be closed as it was almost insolvent, the OTS could not closed it because the WAMU’s assessment 
fee was the biggest portion of operating budget for the OTS. In order not to lose the OTS’ biggest 
resource for its operating budget, they could not appropriately regulate and supervise the WAMU).   
276 Supra note 9, at 170–171 (Regulators for commercial banking industry get more paid, and better 
trained than regulators for thrift industry).  
277 Docking, supra note 1, at 18–19.  
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profits by selling or renting out their property.278 Thus, the borrowers are more likely 
to pay back their loans with the interest going to thrifts. In addition to individual 
borrowers, real estate developers and other market participants borrow money from 
thrifts, resulting in more profits. However, when the housing market is in a bad 
condition, thrifts are exposed to greater credit risk. When the real estate market shows 
poor performance, individual borrowers may face difficulties in paying back their 
loan.279 Also, regarding asset securitization, thrifts may not be able to sell their bonds 
to third parties to obtain more funds because the bonds that thrifts issue seem less 
reliable when the housing market is bad.  
In addition to the causes of the crises, the solutions were similar as well. After 
the S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis, the U.S. government increased insurance 
coverage for deposits to help create a more stable financial market; however, this 
could have caused, to some extent, moral hazard. The U.S. government also reformed 
the regulatory system by drafting and enacting much more stringent regulations, but 
reforming the regulatory systems seems to have only reprimanded some of the 
regulatory agencies, and did not actually provide practicable actions aimed at solving 
the crisis or preventing a future crisis.280  
The government has tried to remove the “too big to fail” theory through 
278 See Jong-Kil An & Changkyu Choi, Real Estate Prices and Profitability of Mutual Savings Bank, 
22 J. OF MONEY & FIN., No. 3 144, 146 (2008).  
279 Id. at 146.  
280 After every financial crisis, the U.S. government tried to reform regulatory systems through 
measures like removing formal regulators, such as the FHLBB and the OTS, and setting new regulators 
instead. However, such actions seem merely to change the regulatory system as a rebuke, but they are 
not effective at preventing a future crisis.  
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regulatory reforms following the crises, but the effectiveness of the reforms remains 
to be seen.281 After the S&L crisis, the U.S. government enacted the IBBEA to enable 
bank holding companies to become large in scale as long as the BHCs were “well-
capitalized and well-managed.” 282 Thus, this Act could have contributed to the 
fallacy of “too big to fail.” The Dodd-Frank Act, after the mortgage crisis, also 
permitted bank holding companies to grow big as long as they are “well-capitalized 
and well-managed.”283 Although the U.S. government has tried to eliminate the issue 
through new legislation, the government has failed to attack the “too big to fail” 
problem properly. For these reasons, the U.S. government has often been criticized for 
not having learned from previous experience.284  
2.  The S&L Crisis and the Korean Savings Bank Crisis 
The S&L crisis and the current Korean savings bank crisis share many 
commonalities. Firstly, external economic factors contributed to the crises.285 In the 
U.S., after the Great Depression, the collapse of the financial housing market was the 
main factor for the S&L crisis, and in Korea, the global financial crisis of 2008 was 
the cause of the current savings bank crisis.286 Because savings institutions in both 
countries operate within a more limited sector of the market than the commercial 
banking industry, they are more easily affected by external economic circumstances.  
281 Docking, supra note 1, at 26.  
282 Id. at 25. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 26. 
285 Choi, supra note 4, at 199–201. 
286 Id. 
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Secondly, deregulation in both countries led to the crises. The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) and Garn-St 
Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982 (Garn-St Act), are the typical examples of 
deregulation for the savings and loan industry in the U.S.287 As mentioned above, the 
purpose of these acts was to assist troubled thrifts, but thrifts used the assistance to 
invest in high-risk and high-return activities. In Korea, the change of the official title 
from savings and finance company to savings bank was the clear manifestation of 
deregulation. 288 Because of the new official title for savings banks, they could 
participate in a wider spectrum of activities with less regulation.  
Increased deposit insurance was also one cause of the crises in both countries. 
In the U.S., the deposit insurance was increased from $40,000 to $100,000 pursuant to 
the DIDMCA.289 Korean deposit insurance for savings banks was increased from 
approximately $20,000 to $50,000. 290  With weaker regulation and increased 
depository insurance coverage, U.S. savings institutions pursued high-risk and high-
return investment, and moral hazard spread. 291  Korean savings banks also 
experienced the same problems of seeking high-risk and high-return business, and of 
moral hazard of the large shareholders and CEOs.292 A CEO or a large shareholder 
was able to own a thrift in both countries, and this resulted in severe moral hazard, 
287 Supra note 9, at 175. 
288 Choi, supra note 4, at 201. 
289 Supra note 9, at 176. 
290 Choi, supra note 4, at 201. 
291 See supra note 9, at 176. 
292 Choi, supra note 4, at 204.  
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which was one of the main reasons for both crises.293  
Finally, insolvency processes of savings institutions were very similar 
between both countries. The U.S. government encouraged prime institutions to take 
over insolvent savings institutions, and the Korean authority also persuaded prime 
institutions to take over failed savings institutions by giving several enticing favors, 
all of which resulted in much worse outcomes in both countries.294 For the U.S., if 
the government had promptly closed failed savings institutions at the start of the S&L 
crisis, the government could have avoided spending the huge amount of money that 
fell on the taxpayers. 
3.  The Mortgage Crisis and the Korean Savings Bank Crisis 
The mortgage crisis and the Korean savings bank crisis have similar aspects 
with respect to risky lending activities and regulator’s inappropriate actions against 
the activities. One of the fundamental problems that U.S. thrifts and Korean savings 
banks have seems to be the fact that they both have fewer business models than their 
competitors, namely, the commercial banks. They need their exclusive area of 
business to maintain stability no matter how competitive financial markets are. But 
without providing solutions to the fundamental problem, U.S. thrifts and Korean 
savings banks may have continued seeking higher profit by participating in risky 
293 See id. at 214—215; Suzanne Kapner, Financier Charles H. Keating Jr. Symbolized the Savings & 
Loan Crisis Era, THE WALL STREET J., April 2, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304432604579476340331548028; The Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Investigation: Who is Involved, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 22, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/22/business/the-lincoln-savings-and-loan-investigation-who-is-
involved.html. 
294 Choi, supra note 4.  
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lending activities or new activities that they have not entered before.   
Prior to the mortgage crisis, thrifts participated in a high-risk lending practice, 
called pay-option ARM, and other risky practices.295 All practices were deemed high 
risk because lenders placed a greater emphasis on making loans rather than making 
sure that borrowers had the ability to pay their loans back. This risky practice was 
possible because the regulatory agencies allowed thrifts to do so.296 The riskier the 
lending practice thrifts participated in, the higher the interest rates they received. The 
regulatory agencies also benefited from this situation in the foam of assessment fees 
that thrifts under their supervision paid for regulation and supervision.297  
During the mortgage crisis of 2008, the seven biggest depository financial 
institutions failed, and five of them were thrifts.298 The pay-option ARM was one of 
the contributing factors of the mortgage crisis, and four of the big five originators of 
pay-options ARMs in the U.S. were thrifts as well.299 Thrifts, including big thrifts, 
engaged in high-risk lending activities, and regulators did not appropriately regulate 
and supervise against this. As a result, big thrifts went bankrupt and their existing 
regulator, the OTS, could not avoid being criticized and was eventually abolished.  
 Similar to the U.S. experience, large Korean savings banks, including the 
biggest savings bank, also failed mostly due to high-risk lending practices, such as 
295 See infra pp.127–8 for more information on the pay-option ARMs. 
296 KATHLEEN, supra note 6 at, 179. 
297 Id.  
298 The five biggest ARMs originators, such as Downey, Golden West, Countrywide, WaMu, and 
IndyMac, got into big trouble during the crisis of 2008. Id. 
299 Id. at 176. 
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Project Financing.300 PF is similar to the ARM because lenders were not sure whether 
borrowers had the ability to pay back their loans. Without any guarantee, savings 
banks made loans to borrowers based more on prospects, and not on the borrower’s 
ability to pay them back. When borrowers failed to pay loans back to the savings 
banks, the banks met serious difficulties, which led to the savings bank crisis in Korea. 
The regulatory agencies were also illegally connected to the officers, directors, and 
large shareholders of savings banks. The crisis occurred because of the combination 
of high-risk lending practices, deregulation, and the corruption of regulators.  
4.  Summary and Comments 
The S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis were huge crises, precipitated by 
multiple causes. In response to both crises, the U.S. government provided similar 
solutions. Deregulation was a main causes of the crises, and in response the U.S. 
government tried to intensify regulations to both solve the current crises and prevent 
the occurrence of a future crisis. However, the government’s attempt to strengthen 
regulations was limited to changing regulatory agencies, and it seems that the 
government did not consider business prospects.  
In addition, although the government intensified some of the regulatory 
standards, such as the capital requirement and other limitations, the regulatory 
agencies failed to evaluate their own financial conditions due to the corruption within 
agencies like the OTS.301 Without correctly assessing the conditions of thrifts, the 
300 KIM, supra note 6, at 130–136. 
301 Large thrifts participated in high-risk activities and after getting worse, their status was almost 
insolvent, but the OTS did not realize their condition up to six months before the thrifts was closed. 
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increased regulations were useless. After the mortgage crisis of 2008, the government 
tried to respond to the crisis by intensifying regulatory standards, but there was still 
corruption among regulators, which rendered the new regulations useless.  
The U.S. government punished the regulatory agency responsible for the 
crisis by abolishing the OTS. The U.S. government also increased regulations through 
the Dodd-Frank Act, but may not have considered the balance between market 
conditions and regulation. In addition, the theory of “too big to fail” has not 
disappeared, probably due to the exceptions in the Act, which permit bank holding 
companies to grow bigger so long as they are “well-capitalized and well-managed.”302 
Only time can tell whether this regulation is appropriate. And, contrary its purpose, 
which was the consolidation of the regulatory system, the Dodd-Frank Act created 
more regulatory agencies, which increased both regulatory costs and the burden on 
regulated institutions.  
Appropriate deregulation through legislation was needed because in order to 
revitalize the financial market, deregulation is sometimes needed to deal with 
unexpected situations in the market. But Congress often allows deregulation of the 
financial market in order to avoid being blamed when a depressed financial market 
negatively affects the economy. At that time, the legislators merely passed a lenient 
statute to normalize financial markets without considering other relevant factors. 
Furthermore, the government should have trained regulators of savings institutions to 
be as good as the regulators of the commercial banking industry, rather than punishing 
This likely happened from the OTS’s corruption, and insufficiently trained staff. See KATHLEEN, supra 
note 6, at 177, 184. 
302 Docking, supra note 1, at 25.  
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the regulators of savings institutions. Most of the employees from the OTS have been 
transferred to new regulatory agencies, and the employees responsible for savings 
institutions should be educated and trained so that they can have the same level of 
competency as those who are responsible for the commercial banking industry. Lastly, 
current insurance coverage should be adjusted as it may have adverse effects on the 
financial institutions investing in high-risk activities. 
Regarding deregulation, the relationship between regulation and the market 
must be considered. In order to provide a safe and reliable market environment for 
thrifts and savings banks, the government should strive for a balance between 
regulation and market concerns. In the financial market, the regulatory system cycles 
between deregulation and strong regulation; unexpected situations can happen at any 
time, and this may result in one form or the other. In general, after every financial 
crisis, the cycle of regulation should be acknowledged in order to solve the problem 
and prevent another crisis, as well as when the market needs to be revitalized. The 
following are examples of the cycle in the U.S. and Korea. 
In the U.S., every financial crisis has resulted in stronger regulations enacted 
by legislators.303 With the increased regulation, the market may suffer. For instance, 
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, smaller banks would be required to spend much 
more on compliance costs, and be forced to observe increased standardization 
requirements that may harm customers.304 Small banks usually deal with customers 
303 LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 
67 (4th ed. 2011). 
304 Tanya D. Marsh & Joseph W. Norman, Reforming The Regulation of Community Banks After Dodd-
Frank 2 (Working Paper Series, Oct. 1, 2013). 
130 
 
                                           
who have lower credit rates, but increased regulations limit the ability of small banks 
to deal with these customers. Unlike commercial banks, if small banks lose their main 
customers, they cannot survive due to the limited nature of their financial products. 
This may eventually result in the failure of small banks, and their main customers 
may be unable to access financial services.  
However, when financial markets begin failing, legislators often provide 
weak regulations in order to prevent the economy from weakening. Thus, 
deregulation may help the market improve. For example, Congress enacted the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in order to allow thrifts to grow by participating in new 
activities across all states.305 With this deregulation, thrifts were able to expand their 
industry.  
In addition to the regulation and market cycles in the U.S., in Korea, 
deregulation positively affected the savings bank market. The total asset size of 
Korean savings banks in 2010 increased by more than three times from 2003 under 
deregulation that allowed savings banks to expand their branches.306 This may prove 
that deregulation assisted savings banks to develop their business and to increase their 
size.307 Also, in order to promote competitiveness of the financial industry, Korea has 
305 BENTON E. GUP & JAMES W. KOLARI, COMMERCIAL BANKING: THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 42–43 
(3d ed. 2005); Docking, supra note 1, at 22.  
306 Sangjo Kim, Present Condition, Cause, and Measure of Poor Savings Banks 39, THE KOR. MONEY 
& FIN. ASSOCIATION (2011), http://www.kmfa.or.kr/paper/annual/2011/2011_02_s.pdf. 
307Id.  
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tried to seek deregulation for the last decade.308 This may mean deregulation is 
positively used to develop the financial industry in Korea. Of course, the Korean 
government needs to improve its supervisory and regulatory system in order to create 
a sound and safe financial market. However, increased regulations without analyzing 
market characteristics may prevent financial institutions from increasing their 
competitiveness.    
In conclusion, the balance between regulation and market conditions is very 
important for savings institutions in both the U.S. and Korea. Strong regulation 
without considering market conditions may create obstacles for the continued 
existence of savings institutions. In addition, creating lenient regulations without 
appropriate alternatives for savings institutions may lead to investments in high-risk 
activities, which may result in a financial crisis. In this sense, legislators in the U.S. 
and Korea should make balancing regulation and market conditions their primary 
objective.  
308 Gunho Lee, Korea Employer’s Federation, Financial Industry Should Focus on Consolidation of 
Competitive Power Rather than Regulation Strengthening (2010), 
http://www.kefplaza.com/labor/manage/econo_view.jsp?nodeid=289&idx=9001. 
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VII.  SUGGESTIONS FOR THE U.S. THRIFT INDUSTRY 
 
The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to solve the mortgage crisis and to 
prevent future crises.1 However, the Act may have adverse effects on the thrift 
industry. First, the Act is not consistent with the guiding principles of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), which are to pursue the most effective and efficient 
financial regulatory system. 2 Although one of the purposes of the Act was to 
consolidate regulatory systems, the regulatory system has become much more 
complex since the Act came into effect.3  
Pursuant to the Act, four regulatory agencies responsible for thrift supervision 
were created in place of the OTS.4 This complex regulatory system may create turf 
battles among the regulatory agencies. Under the dual banking system in the U.S., 
regulatory agencies try to increase the number of thrifts under their supervision in 
order to earn more assessment fees, and they do this by providing more lenient 
regulations than the other regulatory agencies.5 In order to eliminate the turf battles 
among the agencies, the U.S. government should consider consolidating the complex 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 
(2009). 
3 Alexander H. Modell, IX. Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation, 
and the Board of Governors, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 562, 562–573 (2011). 
4 Id.   
5  See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 179 (2011).  
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regulatory system in accordance with the suggestion from the GAO. The U.S. 
government should also consider creating a new budget system to control the possible 
turf battles. One possibility is a budget system that would regularly distribute 
operating budgets to each regulatory agency irrespective of the number of regulated 
institutions each agency supervises.     
As regulatory agencies compete with each other to earn assessment fees from 
the institutions that are under their supervision, the regulatory agencies are more 
likely to provide inappropriate or undesirable benefits to the institutions under their 
regulation. This is also not accordance with the principle of the GAO, which holds 
that a regulatory agency should be independent from its regulated institutions.6 As 
long as regulators are dependent on regulated institutions for assessment fees, they 
cannot fairly or appropriately regulate and oversee the institutions that are under their 
supervision. The U.S. government could also use the new budget system, used to 
control turf battles, to make regulatory agencies independent from their regulated 
institutions by collectively pooling and distributing operating budgets to the agencies. 
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, regulatory agencies made the commercial 
banking industry and the thrift industry subject to nearly the same extent of 
regulation.7 The regulatory agencies treat mid-sized and large thrifts with a similar 
degree of regulation as commercial banks, and regulate smaller thrifts as community 
6 Id (Because the WAMU was the biggest regulated thrift and paying the largest assessment fees to the 
OTS, the OTS could not appropriately regulate the WAMU. If the OTS strictly regulated the WAMU, it 
might have converted to commercial banking industry).  
7 Carol Beaumier et al., Protiviti, U.S. Regulatory Reform – Impact on the Thrift Industry, available at 
http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/POV/POV-US-Regulatory-Reform-Thrift.pdf. 
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banks.8 However, thrifts may struggle to comply with such requirements under the 
Act because the commercial banking industry and the thrift industry are considerably 
different with respect to size, business model, financial customers, and limitations. 
Regulating the commercial banking industry and the thrift industry in the same 
manner is opposed to one of the main principles of the GAO, which suggests that 
regulators should put differentiated regulations on financial institutions that pose 
different risks.9 As thrifts likely pose much less of a risk to the financial market than 
commercial banks do, they should be regulated to a lesser degree.  
In addition to failing to comply with the principles of the GAO, the Dodd-
Frank Act also imposes an additional penalty if thrifts do not comply with the QTL 
test, which requires thrifts to invest more than 65% of all assets into residential 
mortgage loans.10 Prior to the Act, even if thrifts failed to comply with the QTL test, 
they had a grace period of one year to comply with the test, but this grace period was 
eliminated by the Act.11 The government should reconsider reinstating the grace 
period of the QTL test because thrifts occupy a smaller portion of the mortgage 
lending business than before. Because of the test, thrifts are vulnerable whenever the 
housing market and the U.S. economy are unstable. 12  Therefore, the 65% 
8 PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Thrifts & Thrift Holding Companies 2 (2011). 
9 Supra note 2, at 60. 
10 V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 5, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf. 
11 Id.  
12 Jong-Kil An & Changkyu Choi, Real Estate Prices and Profitability of Mutual Savings Bank, 22 J. 
OF MONEY & FIN., No. 3 144, 145 (2008). 
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requirement should be adjusted based on the decreased portion that thrifts occupy in 
the mortgage lending market.  
In addition, U.S. regulatory agencies should be more independent from their 
government’s stance on financial policy. Because the agencies are bound by their 
government’s policy agenda, regulatory agencies may struggle to act and manage 
efficiently during a financial crisis. For example, if during a financial crisis, the 
regulatory agencies find it necessary to immediately close failed institutions, but the 
government’s policy is to promote acquisitions, the regulatory agencies cannot act 
contrary to the government’s position. For this reason, regulatory agencies should be 
independent from the government’s financial policy agenda in order to act 
appropriately and swiftly during a crisis.   
Next, regarding the regulators of thrifts, most of the employees have 
transferred from the OTS to the new regulatory agencies that regulate thrifts.13 These 
are the same employees who failed to supervise and regulate thrifts when they worked 
under the OTS, and it is doubtful whether they can now do a good job regulating 
thrifts based solely on the fact that they moved to new agencies. In order to improve 
thrift regulation, these employees should be better educated and trained by the new 
agencies.  
Lastly, but most importantly, thrifts need to occupy their own business area 
and not participate in high-risk activities like the ARMs. Because the thrift industry 
had lost much of its business to competitors, it was pushed to engage in risky 
13 12 U.S.C. § 5432 (2010). 
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investments. To prevent thrifts from engaging in high-risk activities, the thrift industry 
should be permitted to enjoy some level of protection, and occupy their own business 
area without losing it to their competitors. 
VIII.  SUGGESTIONS FOR KOREAN SAVINGS BANKS 
 
One of the main causes of the Korean savings banks crisis was owners’ moral 
hazard.14 The owners or largest shareholders of savings banks illegally used their 
bank’s deposits for private purposes.15 In response to this problem, the Korean 
government added new regulations to strengthen the monitoring and supervision over 
such misuses.16 However, it is still doubtful whether the additional regulations can 
prevent owners or the largest shareholders from doing illegal activities. This is 
because there already had been provisions in place to prevent them from doing illicit 
activities, but those provisions proved to be ineffective.17 In order to prevent the 
misuse of power by a single owner, and learning from the U.S. regulation of thrifts, 
the number of owners for each savings bank should be at least five.18 To this end, it is 
necessary for the Korean legislature to draft and enact new provisions on the 
corporate governance structure of savings banks.    
14 Choi, Young-joo, The Influence of Large Shareholder in Savings Bank Insolvency and Regulation, 
53 PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 193, 194 (2012). 
15 Id. at 211.    
16 Sangho jeochukeunhaengbeob [Mutual Savings Banks Act], Act No. 12100, Aug. 13, 2013, art. 22(6) 
(S. Kor.). With this additional provision, the regulatory agency now has more authority to monitor and 
supervise CEOs of savings banks in order to prevent the illegal activities.  
17 See Choi, supra note 14, at 221. 
18 12 C.F.R. §144.5 (b)(8). 
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Regulatory agencies’ corruption was also one of the reasons for the crisis.19 In 
order to prevent corruption in regulatory agencies, regulators of savings banks should 
be thoroughly educated not to be involved in such corruption. The Korean 
government should provide a program for such education thereby improving the 
quality of supervision by the regulatory agency for savings banks. With better quality, 
we may expect the corruption to be eradicated.   
On top of the direct causes of the savings banks crisis, many concerns were 
also raised in the aftermath of the crisis. The Korean government actively 
recommended that other healthy financial institutions acquire insolvent savings 
banks.20 During the process of such acquisitions, the government provided several 
benefits, such as deregulation, to the acquirers as a trade-off.21 By doing so, the 
government was able to cut its rescue expenses. However, it should be of great 
concern that this policy may lead to a much bigger disaster in the future as the U.S. 
precedent of the late 1980s shows. 
 After the S&L crisis, the U.S. government preferred the acquisition of 
insolvent thrifts by other financial institutions to closures, but such acquisitions 
resulted in a much bigger disaster.22 Considering the U.S. precedent and the currently 
19 See Jaeho, Chun, the FSS Already Forgot the Nightmare of the Savings Banks Crisis, CHOSUNBIZ, 
Mar. 19, 2014, available at http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/03/19/2014031901518.html. 
20 Choi, supra note 14, at 202 (the Korean government chose the policy of merger and acquisition as a 
solution for the savings banks crisis, but it made the crisis much worse).   
21 Id. at 202–203. 
22  NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, 
ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1993) (if the government closed the insolvent thrifts instead 
of the acquisition, the cost the government spent to solve the S&L crisis were not over $25 billion). 
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unstable condition of Korean savings banks, the Korean government should 
contemplate closing down insolvent savings banks rather than helping them through 
acquisitions. Also, regulatory agencies should be able to manage and supervise 
separately from their government’s financial policy agenda. Even though the 
Financial Supervisory Services is an independent agency from the Korean 
government, the FSS’s decisions are still affected by the government’s policy. In the 
case of a financial crisis, closing failed institutions is often the best solution, but the 
government’s inclination is to delay the closure and to promote acquisitions. The 
regulatory agencies, therefore, cannot close the failed institutions, and this situation 
may result in a bigger crisis in the future. For this reason, financial regulatory 
agencies should be more independent from their government.  
It is undeniable that the increased insurance coverage for deposits has resulted 
in moral hazard committed by many owners of savings banks.23 Similar to the 
Korean savings bank crisis, the deposit insurance increase was one of the reasons for 
the S&L crisis in the U.S. The managers of thrifts used the insurance to make bad 
decisions.24 However, after the S&L crisis, the U.S. government failed to provide the 
right solutions to the problem of deposit insurance.25 
However, the government spent about $160 billion to figure out the S&L crisis with the policy of the 
acquisition. If the government promptly closed the insolvent thrift without considering the acquisition, 
the government could spend less than $25 billion, but not the $160 billion. See 1 DIVISION OF 
RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 170–169 
(1997). 
23 Choi, supra note 14, at 201. 
24 See Charles E. Schumer & J. Brian Graham, The Unfinished Business of Firrea, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 68, 73 (1990). 
25 Id. at 74. 
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 In response to this problem, the Korean government should provide lower 
insurance coverage to the savings bank industry. Current coverage for deposit 
insurance in Korea is approximately $50,000, which applies to all financial depository 
institutions. However, as savings banks are required to keep lower capital than 
commercial banks, the coverage should be less than the current level for savings 
banks. Because savings banks have their particular consumer base, such as low-
income people, providing lower deposit insurance coverage may not hurt the business 
of savings banks. For these reasons, the government should reconsider the current 
insurance system for depository institutions.   
The Korean government eased the Loan to Value ratio to promote its housing 
market.26 But, after easing the ratio, if the housing market turns for the worse, 
financial institutions will face higher risks. Prior to the S&L crisis in the U.S., the U.S. 
government similarly eased the Loan to Value ratio, which was one of the reasons for 
the crisis.27 The Korean government, learning from the U.S. experience, should 
reconsider the ratio in order to prepare for any unexpected future downturns in the 
housing market. 
Lastly, it should be noted that both U.S. thrifts and Korean savings banks 
participated in high-risk activities. Korean savings banks have been experiencing 
difficulties in earning profits due to severe competition with commercial banks, and 
having no other choice, they were pushed into engaging in high-risk activities. In this 
26 Kim Jae-Kyoung, Korean economy and ‘Greenspan’s bubbles,’ THE KOREA TIMES, Sept. 14, 2014, 
available at http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2014/09/602_164547.html. 
27 Choi, supra note 14, at 200. 
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sense, similar to the suggestion for the U.S. thrift industry, Korean savings banks 
should be able to enjoy some protection for their particular business area. Without 
such protection, deregulation and any other friendly policy on savings banks may not 
prove to be effective. In addition, because savings banks are especially vulnerable to 
the condition of the housing market, they need to have their own business area in 
order to reach and maintain financial stability. 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
The adoption of more stringent regulations has followed every financial crisis 
in order to prevent a future financial crisis. However, rather than considering how the 
new regulations would affect financial markets, the U.S. government focused more on 
enhancing the regulatory system. After the mortgage crisis of 2008, the U.S. 
government enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank Act) to create a stable and sound financial market by protecting 
financial consumers.1 However, by heavily focusing on strengthening the regulatory 
system, the Act may negatively affect the thrift industry. With the strengthened 
regulations, the U.S. thrift industry may face serious trouble because the government 
concentrated primarily on preventing another financial crisis without considering the 
thrift’s unique situation. In order for thrifts to survive, the current regulatory system 
needs to be reconsidered.  
The Korean savings bank industry is still facing many difficulties despite 
multiple attempts by the Korean government to solve the savings banks crisis. For this 
reason, this dissertation suggests that the Korean government should provide 
recommendations to the industry by reconsidering the unique conditions of the 
Korean savings bank industry and by learning from U.S. experiences. 
First, this dissertation discussed how the Dodd-Frank Act might adversely 
affect the U.S. thrift industry with intensified regulations.2 One of the purposes of the 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
2 See Chapter IV. 
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Act was to consolidate regulatory systems, but the Act actually creates even more 
complex regulatory systems. This may cause turf battles among the regulatory 
agencies. In order to consolidate the regulatory systems and avoid the turf battles, the 
U.S. government should consider reforming the current regulatory system under the 
Act in accordance with the principles suggested by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO).3 The Act should comply with the following GAO principles: firstly, 
the U.S. government should consider consolidating regulatory systems;4 secondly, 
regulatory agencies should be independent from their regulated institutions;5 finally, 
the regulatory agencies should place different regulations on commercial banks than 
thrifts as thrifts pose different risks to the financial market. 6  In addition to 
comporting with the GAO, the U.S. government should create a new budget system to 
prevent the possible turf battles that result from having a complex regulatory system, 
and to ensure that regulatory agencies are independent from their regulated 
institutions. The assessment fees collected from regulated institutions cause problems 
like the turf battles and the dependency of regulatory agencies, as most of the 
agencies’ operating budget comes from the assessment fees. The new budget system 
can solve these issues by pooling and distributing assessment fees to regulatory 
agencies.  
3 Chapter IV. Part C.2. 
4 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 
55 (2009). 
5 Id. at 59.  
6 Id. at 60. 
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In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act made no change to the Qualified Thrift 
Lender (QTL) test, which requires thrifts to invest 65% of their total assets into 
residential mortgage lending.7 The Act even intensified the test by removing the one-
year grace period that allowed thrifts to meet the 65% requirement within a year from 
when the thrifts failed to satisfy such requirement.8 However, this test makes thrifts 
especially vulnerable to a bad economy or unstable housing market. Because thrifts 
currently occupy much less of the mortgage lending market than before, the U.S. 
government should decrease the percentage of the QTL test and reinstate the grace 
period.9 
U.S. regulatory agencies should also be more independent from their 
government’s stance on financial policy. As long as the agencies’ decisions are 
affected by their government’s policy, their regulatory ability will be limited and less 
efficient in response to a crisis.   
Next, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was 
abolished and most employees from the OTS were transferred to new regulatory 
agencies that are now in charge of supervising thrifts.10 The quality of regulators for 
thrifts had always been lower than that of regulators for commercial banks although 
7 V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 5, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf. 
8 Id.  
9 PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Thrifts & Thrift Holding Companies 2 (2011). 
10 Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption, and the State Role 
in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 171, 174 (2011). 
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the quality may be the same nowadays.11 However, the OTS failed to appropriately 
supervise and regulate the thrift industry. Therefore, in order to provide better quality 
supervision and regulation of thrifts, the U.S. government should consider educating 
and training the transferred regulators.   
Most significantly, this dissertation analyzed why several of the biggest thrifts 
engaged in high-risk and high-return investments, and then found that thrifts are now 
faced with a harsh business environment because they lost a significant portion of 
their business area to competition with other financial institutions in the mortgage 
lending market. Rather than deregulating the thrift industry, the U.S. government 
should consider providing some protection for their particular business area so that 
they can recover to a stable condition without participating in high-risk activities.  
Second, this dissertation discussed how Korean savings banks could overcome 
their current difficulties since the Korean savings bank crisis began in 2010. As 
mentioned previously, the Korean government can learn useful solutions from the U.S. 
experience, as there are many similarities between the U.S. savings institutions and 
the Korean savings banks. In order to prevent owners’ moral hazard of savings banks, 
the Korean government added a new provision to the Mutual Savings Banks Act. 
However, it is doubtful whether the additional provision will prove to be effective. 
Therefore, the Korean government should add a new provision under which savings 
banks are required to consist of at least five owners, so that they can hold each other 
11 1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 170–171 (1997) (as the quality of regulatory employees for commercial banking industry were 
higher than the quality of regulatory employees for thrift industry, the former employees received 
salaries about thirty percent more than the latter employees received). 
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in check.12 
Also, it cannot be denied that the owners’ moral hazard was closely connected 
to regulators’ corruption and increased insurance coverage for deposits. In response to 
corruption, the Korean government should consider systemically educating and 
training regulators, thereby preventing them from engaging in illegal behavior. 
Regarding the increased insurance coverage for deposits, the government should 
provide lower insurance deposit coverage to the savings bank industry than that of 
commercial banks as savings banks have lower capital requirements than commercial 
banks.  
In response to the Korean savings bank crisis, the government strongly 
recommended that healthy financial institutions acquire insolvent savings banks. 
However, the acquisition policy may cause a much bigger disaster in the future as a 
similar situation happened in the late 1980s in the U.S.13 The Korean government 
should reconsider the policy by learning from U.S. precedent. In order to deal with a 
future crisis, the regulatory agencies should be independent from their government’s 
financial policy agenda. The agencies’ ability to respond to a crisis are limited and 
less effective as long as the agencies’ regulatory and supervisory actions depend on 
the current government’s stance on financial policy. 
Rather than easing regulations on the savings banking industry, including the 
Loan to Value ratio, the Korean government, learning from the U.S. experience of the 
12 12 C.F.R. §144.5 (b)(8). 
13 JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 187 (1991). 
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1980s, should provide a unique environment to savings banks so that they can have 
their own business area without having to engage in high-risk activities. As long as 
the government protects the savings bank industry with respect to their unique 
business area, the industry may be able to overcome its difficulties, and contribute to a 
safe and sound financial market in Korea.  
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 Appendix 
 
[MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS ACT], Act No. 12100 Aug. 13, 2013 (S. 
Kor.). 
 
Article 1 (Purpose) 
 
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the growth of the national economy by 
guiding savings banks for sound operation to assist them in providing citizens and 
small and medium enterprises with greater convenience in receiving financial services, 
protecting customers, and maintaining credit system in good order. 
 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010] 
 
Article 4 (Business Area of Mutual Savings Banks) 
 
(1) The business area of a mutual savings bank shall be any of the following areas 
based on the location of its principal business office (hereinafter referred to as 
"principal office"): 
1. Seoul Special Metropolitan City; 
2. The area covering Incheon Metropolitan City and Gyeonggi-do; 
3. The area covering Busan Metropolitan City, Ulsan Metropolitan City, and 
Gyeongsangnam-do; 
4. The area covering Daegu Metropolitan City, Gyeongsangbuk-do, and Gangwon-do; 
5. The area covering Gwangju Metropolitan City, Jeollanam-do, Jeollabuk-do, and 
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province; 
6. The area covering Daejeon Metropolitan City, Chungcheongnam-do, and 
Chungcheongbuk-do. 
 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a mutual savings bank which merges with another 
mutual savings bank or receives contract transfer may include the business area of the 
mutual savings bank which ceases to exist due to the merger or which makes the 
contract transfer in its own business area. 
 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010] 
 
Article 7 (Restriction on Establishment of Branches, etc.) 
 
(1) A mutual savings bank may not establish any branch office or liaison office 
(which includes a branch office or administration office that performs part of its 
business affairs, or any other similar place; hereinafter referred to as "branch office or 
similar"), other than its principal office: Provided, That the foregoing shall not apply 
in cases where a branch office or similar is established by the relevant mutual savings 
bank within the business area under Article 4 after obtaining a license from the 
Financial Services Commission as prescribed by Presidential Decree. 
 
(2) Notwithstanding the proviso to paragraph (1), a mutual savings bank prescribed by 
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Presidential Decree may establish a branch office or similar outside the business area 
under Article 4 when it obtains a license as provided by Presidential Decree. 
 
(3) A mutual savings bank seeking to establish a branch office or similar under the 
proviso to paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) shall, for each of such branch office or 
similar, increase the capital by an amount exceeding the amount prescribed by 
Presidential Decree. In such cases, the capital means paid-in capital. 
 
(4) The Financial Services Commission may attach conditions to a license granted 
pursuant to the proviso to paragraph (1) and paragraph (2). 
 
[This Article Newly Inserted by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010] 
 
 
Article 9 (Use, etc. of Designation) 
 
(1) Each mutual savings bank shall include the words "mutual savings bank" or 
"savings bank" in its name. 
 
(2) No person other than mutual savings banks under this Act may use such a title as 
"mutual savings bank," "savings bank," "mutual savings company," "mutual loan 
company," "people's bank," or any other similar title. 
 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010] 
 
Article 11 (Business Activities) 
 
(1) Any mutual savings bank may engage in the following business activities 
systematically and continuously for profit: 
1. Credit mutual aid deposit service; 
2. Credit installment savings service; 
3. Receipt of deposits and installment deposits; 
4. Extension of loans; 
5. Discount of commercial notes; 
6. Domestic and foreign exchange of money; 
7. Receipt of deposits for safekeeping; 
8. Agency for collection and payment; 
9. Intermediary or agency for corporate mergers and purchases; 
10. Agency for the State, public organizations, and financial institutions; 
11. Business affairs vicariously carried out for or entrusted by the Korea Federation of 
Savings Banks under Article 25; 
12. Issuance and management of electronic means for debit payment under the 
Electronic Financial Transactions Act and settlement of payments therefor (In such 
cases, the scope of business shall be limited to cases in which the business affairs of 
the Korea Federation of Savings Banks under Article 25-2 (1) 9 are jointly carried 
out); 
13. Issuance, management, and sales of prepaid electronic means payment under the 
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Electronic Financial Transactions Act and settlement of payments therefor (In such 
cases, the scope of business shall be limited to cases in which the business affairs of 
the Korea Federation of Savings Banks under Article 25-2 (1) 10 are jointly carried 
out); 
14. Investment brokerage business, investment trade business, and trust business 
authorized by the Financial Services Commission under the Financial Investment 
Services and Capital Markets Act; 
15. Business activities incidental to those under subparagraphs 1 through 14 or those 
required for achieving the purposes under Article 1, which are authorized by the 
Financial Services Commission. 
 
(2) The minimum maintenance ratio of the aggregate of credit extensions to private 
individuals and small and medium enterprises within a business area to the amount of 
total credit, and further detailed matters to be observed otherwise by a mutual savings 
bank in carrying out its business activities under paragraph (1) shall be prescribed by 
Presidential Decree. 
 
(3) Each mutual savings bank shall facilitate convenience in financial services for 
ordinary citizens and small and medium enterprises in compliance with this Act and 
orders issued pursuant to this Act in carrying out its business activities under 
paragraph (1). 
 
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010] 
 
Article 22-6 (Inspection of Large Shareholders, etc.) 
 (1) Where the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service deems that a large 
shareholder of a mutual savings bank is suspected of violating Article 12-3, he/she 
may require an employee under his/her command to inspect the business and property 
of the relevant large shareholder to a minimum extent necessary for such purpose. 
(2) Where the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service deems that a person 
referred to in Article 37 (1) 1 and 2 is suspected of violating paragraphs (1) through (3) 
of the same Article, he/she may require an employee under his/her command to 
inspect the business and property of the relevant person to a minimum extent 
necessary for such purpose. 
(3) Article 23 (2) and (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis to inspections under 
paragraphs (1) and (2). 
[This Article Newly Inserted by Act No. 12100, Aug. 13, 2013] 
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